We gained exclusive access to Ukrainian cyberwarfare specialists and front line intelligence officers for our new @thetimes documentary, The Starlink Hack That Fooled Russian Forces... 1/

Elon Musk claims that Ukraine allegedly violated Starlink's terms of use and used the system on combat drones.

As someone who was inside the process at the Ministry of Defense, I can say with certainty that this is not true.

In February of this year, whitelists were introduced. uld be registered by both military personnel and civilians.
But for any satellite terminal to work while on the move, it had to be added to a special list and connected to the military Starshield system. Otherwise, no satellite communication terminals in Ukraine would work.

In other words, using civilian Starlink for drone missions was technically impossible. All drone missions that required satellite communication could only be carried out using Starshield.

We are very grateful to the United States and SpaceX for access to critically important satellite communications. Ukraine did not violate the terms of use.

Starlink, Starshield, GPS, and the Claims About “Hacking”: A Technical Explanation

A post accusing Ukraine of “hacking” #Starlink is spreading rapidly on this platform.
The technical claims in that post are incorrect. They seem based on a collection of rumors circulating on Telegram, including information from Russian channels.
Unfortunately, this post and others like it are receiving an enormous number of likes and reposts.

That's why I believe it's important to address these claims with clear technical explanations rather than allow misleading information to spread unchecked.
This is a fairly detailed post, but I think the distinction matters.

Some of the technical information below comes from my own research and detailed analysis of Starlink terminal firmware, particularly its GPS, PNT, and velocity-processing systems.

#⃣ 1. What are Starlink and Starshield?

People still frequently confuse the two.

Starlink is SpaceX's commercial satellite internet service, designed for consumers, businesses, and other commercial users.

Starlink supports operation in motion, but the permitted speed depends on the service plan, equipment, and geographic region.
Under commonly available commercial plans, the maximum authorized operating speed is 160 km/h (100 mph).
In Ukraine, Starlink terminals are subject to a specific speed restriction: they cannot operate at speeds above approximately 75–80 km/h.
This Ukraine-specific restriction was introduced less than a year ago, in coordination with Ukrainian authorities, to prevent Starlink terminals from being used on drones.

Starshield is SpaceX's government-focused product and service family, based on Starlink technology and developed for national security applications.
It includes secure communications, Earth observation, and hosted payload capabilities.

Some Starshield systems involve dedicated government spacecraft and infrastructure. However, Starshield communications services can also use the underlying Starlink satellite network.

This distinction is important: Starshield does not necessarily mean a completely separate physical satellite constellation or entirely different user terminal hardware.

SpaceX develops and operates the underlying Starlink infrastructure. The U.S. government procures Starshield capabilities through contracts, with ownership and operational control depending on the particular system and arrangement.

The division of authority between SpaceX and the U.S. government has become especially relevant following the October 2026 incident.

Unlike ordinary commercial Starlink service, Starshield configurations used for military operations in Ukraine have supported substantially higher operating speeds.

#⃣ 2. Is Starshield available in Ukraine?

Yes. Starshield is operational in Ukraine and is extensively used by the Ukrainian military.

Starshield service has been used in Ukraine since approximately mid-2023. Subsequent U.S. government contracts and public reporting also confirm its availability.
The United States has procured Starshield services specifically to support Ukrainian military operations.
An October 2026 U.S. Senate letter explicitly confirms that Ukraine receives Starshield services procured by the U.S. government.

Therefore, the idea that Ukraine is somehow obtaining Starshield capabilities by secretly modifying commercial terminals fundamentally misunderstands how these services are provided.

How does the Ukrainian military use these services?

The Ukrainian military uses both commercial Starlink and Starshield.

Commercial Starlink is widely used because of its availability, relatively low cost, and excellent performance. For stationary installations and many other applications, commercial service is entirely sufficient.

Starshield is used for specialized military applications, including drones and other platforms requiring reliable connectivity at higher operating speeds.

These are capabilities provided through the Starshield service itself, not necessarily through unauthorized modifications to commercial Starlink hardware.

Using Starshield for its intended and authorized military applications is not inherently a violation of its service terms.

#⃣ 3. Regarding the October 2026 incident

Beginning on October 13–14, Ukrainian military units encountered unexpected speed restrictions affecting Starshield connectivity.

Terminals that had previously operated at substantially higher speeds began losing connectivity at approximately 160 km/h, with some reports describing interruptions at even lower speeds.

These restrictions disrupted military operations, particularly those involving high-speed unmanned systems.
The consequences were serious. Ukrainian officials reported that the restrictions interfered with drone operations, including efforts to intercept russian attack drones.

The decision-making process remains disputed. Neither SpaceX nor the U.S. government initially accepted responsibility for imposing the restrictions. Subsequent reporting and statements from U.S. lawmakers raised questions about who authorized the changes and which organization had the ability to implement them.

As of October 24, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has officially reported that Starlink/Starshield connectivity is once again stable at speeds exceeding 400 km/h.

#⃣ 4. Does Starshield require separate hardware?

Not necessarily.

This is one of the most important points in the entire discussion.

Starshield is a government-focused service and technology family. In the case of satellite communications provided to Ukraine, existing Starlink terminal hardware can be provisioned to use Starshield service.
In December 2024, Bloomberg reported that a Pentagon contract would provide Starshield access to an additional 2,500 Starlink terminals already deployed in Ukraine, on top of 500 terminals previously covered.
The contracts therefore provided service for a total of 3,000 terminals.

In practice, compatible commercial Starlink hardware can be reassigned to Starshield service through the appropriate authorization and provisioning process.
This requires approval. It is not something that a customer can simply enable through the ordinary Starlink application.

Are there specialized Starshield terminals?

Yes.
For example, there is a specialized variant of the Starlink Mini known internally as `mini1_rugged`.
Based on my hardware research, this model uses an improved GNSS receiver, the Teseo V, instead of the receiver found in the regular Mini.

However, despite having repaired and examined numerous terminals and maintaining contact with people working with this equipment, I have not encountered evidence of this specific variant being supplied to Ukraine.

The Starshield terminals I have encountered or received information about in Ukraine are based on regular Starlink hardware.

Some terminals arrive already configured for Starshield service. Others can be provisioned for it through the appropriate channels.

The key point is simple:
A regular Starlink terminal operating under an authorized Starshield service configuration is still a Starshield terminal from the service perspective. It does not need to be physically modified or “hacked” to obtain that service.

#⃣ 5. Why does a Starlink/Starshield terminal require GPS?

Three years ago, I published an article explaining why GPS is important for Starlink terminals and how to improve GPS reception on the hardware available at that time: olegkutkov.me/2023/11/07/con…

Some of the technical details in that article are now outdated, but the fundamental principles remain relevant.

A Starlink terminal requires sufficiently accurate position and timing information for network synchronization, beamforming, and other aspects of normal operation.

Location information can also be used for geographic service authorization.

Invalid or spoofed GPS data may interfere with these processes. Depending on the magnitude of the error and the firmware's ability to detect it, the terminal may lose connectivity or become unable to operate normally.

Modern firmware also includes mechanisms to detect suspicious or inconsistent GPS information.

When GPS data is considered unreliable, the terminal may attempt to use an alternative source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information derived from Starlink's own satellite constellation.

However, this fallback mechanism is not guaranteed to work reliably under every operating condition.

This distinction helps explain why some hardware modifications focus on improving GPS reception or supplying more reliable positioning data, rather than bypassing Starlink's network authorization mechanisms.

#⃣ 6. What is Starlink PNT?

Starlink PNT is a positioning, navigation, and timing capability that derives information from signals transmitted by Starlink satellites.

By combining satellite measurements with known orbital information, a terminal can estimate its position and movement independently of a conventional GPS receiver.

Starlink firmware contains the necessary functionality to process these measurements and use them as an alternative positioning source.
Initially, this functionality was more of an experimental feature. It was interesting from an engineering perspective, but its accuracy and reliability were limited.

Over time, it has improved significantly.
Modern implementations can provide useful positioning information, including when a terminal is moving.

There are still measurement errors, uncertainties, and limitations, but Starlink-derived PNT can serve as an alternative when GPS is unavailable or unreliable.

Nevertheless, conventional GNSS remains an important and generally preferred source of positioning and timing information in current terminal designs. For now.

Can the terminal operate without GPS?
Under certain conditions, yes.
Starlink firmware provides a gRPC request called `dish_inhibit_gps`, which controls whether GPS is used as a position source.
When GPS use is inhibited, the firmware can attempt to rely on alternative positioning information.

A similar situation occurs when GPS data becomes unavailable because of hardware or communication problems.

However, disabling GPS does not guarantee that the alternative positioning solution will be sufficiently accurate or available.
It also does not automatically change the terminal's service permissions.

#⃣ 7. How does a Starlink terminal determine its moving speed?

The GPS receiver is a primary source of position and velocity information.
Proprietary NMEA messages, including `TMPV`, carry information the terminal's motion-processing logic uses.

The firmware does not necessarily trust these measurements without additional validation.

The firmware can filter GPS-derived velocity and compare it with information from other available sources, including Starlink-derived positioning.

The terminal also contains an inertial measurement unit (IMU), whose acceleration measurements can help evaluate movement and detect inconsistencies.

The firmware applies thresholds and consistency checks to these measurements.
These mechanisms run internally and aren't exposed as user-configurable settings.

If GPS measurements differ significantly from the expected values or fail validation, the firmware can reject them.

However, GPS validation and service-speed enforcement are two different things.

Rejecting GPS data does not automatically mean that the terminal has exceeded the permitted operating speed.
The terminal's service configuration determines whether operation at a particular speed is authorized.

When the relevant speed policy is violated, the terminal may report a condition such as: `MOVING_TOO_FAST_FOR_POLICY`

This distinction is essential when evaluating claims about GPS modification.

Simply changing GPS-reported velocity does not automatically change the terminal's authorized operating speed or eliminate the firmware's internal validation mechanisms.

As explained earlier, appropriately provisioned Starshield service supports high-speed operation without the same restrictions imposed on ordinary commercial configurations.

Therefore, no additional “hacking” is required to obtain high-speed capability when that capability is already authorized as part of the service.

Reliable GNSS reception remains desirable, however.
This is one reason specialized terminal designs may incorporate improved receivers, such as the Teseo V used in the `mini1_rugged` variant.
It also explains the existence of solutions intended to improve GPS reception or provide a more reliable PNT input.

**Improving positioning reliability is not the same thing as bypassing service authorization.**

#⃣ 8. How does Starlink geofencing work?

There are two important factors: geographic service authorization and physical RF coverage.

Understanding the difference is essential.

Geographic service authorization

Starlink uses geographic information to determine where service is available and whether a particular terminal is authorized to operate.

The system uses logical geographic regions rather than relying exclusively on the physical boundaries of satellite beams.

H3 is one geographic indexing system relevant to this discussion. It divides the Earth's surface into hierarchical hexagonal cells that represent geographic locations and regions.

Geographic indexing provides a convenient way to manage coverage and service policies, but an H3 cell should not be confused with a physical satellite beam.

Network authorization can depend on several factors, including geographic location, service configuration, terminal identity, and applicable restrictions.

A terminal may be physically capable of receiving a satellite signal while still being denied access to the service.

This is an important distinction when discussing restricted territories, including russia.

Receiving a Starlink signal does not necessarily mean the terminal is authorized to connect to the network.

Physical RF coverage

Satellite beams cannot perfectly follow national borders or the boundaries of geographic indexing cells.

An RF beam has a physical footprint determined by the satellite antenna, beam steering, operating conditions, and geometry.
Its boundaries are not perfectly sharp.
Consequently, a beam may illuminate areas on both sides of a national border even though the service is authorized on only one side.
This is a normal characteristic of satellite communications, not evidence that geographic service restrictions have been disabled.

The role of GPS in geofencing

The terminal's reported location provides another source of information for determining whether it is operating in an authorized region.

The network can use terminal positioning information, together with its own authorization rules, to determine whether service should be permitted.

When operation is prohibited, the terminal may receive an appropriate disablement code from the network.

These mechanisms should be understood as parts of a broader service authorization system, rather than as a single GPS check controlling everything.

Can geofencing be bypassed by supplying modified GPS coordinates?

This question requires some nuance.
Changing the location reported by a GPS receiver may influence positioning-dependent decisions, but it does not automatically override network authorization.
Starlink also has other information available to evaluate terminal operation, and its firmware includes mechanisms for detecting inconsistent positioning data.

Large discrepancies can disrupt normal positioning and beamforming calculations, trigger validation failures, or cause the terminal to lose connectivity.

Most importantly, changing GPS coordinates does not by itself grant a terminal permission to use a service or geographic region for which it is not authorized.

#⃣ 9. So what exactly is being called a “Starlink hack”?

This is where much of the confusion comes from.

The modifications being discussed online are primarily related to improving GPS reception or providing the terminal with reliable positioning and timing information.

These are technical solutions intended to improve connectivity and stability, particularly when the terminal is moving or operating in an environment with GPS interference.

They do not automatically bypass Starlink's speed restrictions, geographic limitations, or network authorization mechanisms.

As explained earlier, regular Starlink hardware can also operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration, which supports high-speed military applications.

Neither improving GPS reliability nor using an authorized Starshield service constitutes hacking Starlink.

It's important to understand these differences before making accusations based on photographs, rumors, or incomplete technical information.

#⃣ Conclusion

Starlink and Starshield use closely related technologies, but they are different services with different capabilities and restrictions.

Regular Starlink hardware can operate under an officially authorized Starshield service configuration. No special hardware modifications are required.
Improving GPS reception or providing reliable positioning data does not mean bypassing Starlink's network restrictions.

Using Starshield for authorized military operations is not hacking. Neither is improving a terminal's GPS reliability.

My goal is simply to explain how these systems work and clear up the confusion surrounding them.
Technical accusations should be based on evidence, not rumors.

#starlink #starshield #gps

It is now 10 days since @SpaceX hobbled Ukraine’s access to Starshield, its military grade equivalent of Starlink. “Nothing has changed,” an officer tells me. Ukrainian defensive drones intercepting Russian kamikaze drones drop connection at speeds around 140-180km per hour, rendering them useless. Ukrainian cities are completely exposed. There are reports that Putin once again believes he can win the war, forcing Kyiv to capitulate.

UPDATE: The situation with @SpaceX’s Starshield service in Ukraine has improved over the past hour, according to officers. “We’re in the right air now, reaching speeds over 160km/h, with only minor interruptions. It looks like it’s on the way back to working as it did before.”

Ukraine losing access to Starshield raises serious concerns for our national security—like who controls critical capabilities the U.S. government has spent billions to procure & how decisions to restrict them are made. I'm demanding answers from the Department of Defense & SpaceX

NEW: Rosneft deep dive by Bloomberg News

+ Officials at Russia’s largest oil producer are concerned that even a few more months of the war with Ukraine could leave lasting damage across the business.

+ One of Rosneft’s biggest refineries, Ryazan, has been shut for more than half the time since it was first hit by Ukraine in May and has run well below full capacity when operating, according to damage assessments seen by Bloomberg.

+ Another, Syzran, has spent much of the past six months either completely shut or operating at less than a third of capacity, according to data reviewed by Bloomberg. The Tuapse refinery has been offline since April.

+ Ukraine is conducting repeat strikes on the refineries as soon as repairs are completed or nearing completion. The need to repeatedly repair damaged equipment is straining operations and causing costs to pile up to levels that Rosneft officials have privately warned cannot be sustained long-term.

+ Some plants have deliberately slowed repairs as a result, stretching work that should take days into weeks, according to people familiar with the matter.

+ Efforts to protect the facilities with shipping containers, nets and steel cables have proved ineffective against swarms of drones, company plans show.

+ The damage is particularly difficult to repair when strikes hit complex secondary units, whose parts would previously have been sourced from the West. It means relying on Russian-made copies and Chinese imports that can take months to obtain and are not always compatible with existing machinery.

+ It’s put Rosneft into financial trouble. Even before the ramping up of Ukraine’s drone campaign, the company saw a “perfect storm” for its finances. Since then, its profits are down and debt is rising despite what should have been a big windfall from the Iran war.

+ Moscow Credit Bank, which is linked to Rosneft, is showing signs of distress with $8 billion of problem loans. It highlights how both Russia’s energy and banking sectors are coming under strain at the same time, a dynamic causing concern to Russian finance officials.

All this and much more in the full story here: bloomberg.com/news/features/…

There are reports this morning that @SpaceX’s Starshield has been restored for Ukrainian use. That is not the case.

As one staff officer from a key, large unit, told me just now:

“We fly over 180 (km/h), fly for a few minutes, lose connection, drop to 140-150, lose connection, speed up again but the connection is still crashing.”

Wow.

. @SpaceX’s Starshield terminals are still restricted to 160km/h this morning, impacting Ukrainian interceptors that stop Russian drones killing civilians and Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics on occupied territory. This will turn momentum of the war back in Russia’s favour.

We suspected this was the reason Ukraine’s access to Starshield was restricted. But to see it from senior officials in this reporting is still utterly unconscionable.

Let’s be absolutely clear about what this means. The Trump Administration deliberately restricted technology Ukraine relies on to intercept Russian drones and ballistic missiles. It made it harder for Ukraine to defend itself and easier for Russia to carry out its deadly attacks against Ukrainian civilians.

They knew exactly what was at stake. They knew that more Russian drones and missiles would get through, allowing Russia to kill even more Ukrainians. And yet they went ahead anyway.

This is a deliberate weaking of Ukraine’s defenses that only Russia will benefit from. It is a betrayal of our ally that this Administration cannot wash its hands of.

The American people deserve to know who made this decision, why they made it, and how they can possibly justify putting more innocent Ukrainian lives in the crosshairs of Putin’s war machine.
reuters.com/world/europe/o…

Ukraine can't destroy Gazprom's pipelines because doing so inconveniences German consumers.
Ukraine can't hit Russian refineries because that inconveniencs US consumer.
Russia, on the other hand, can destroy Ukraine's energy grid because it inconveniences no one.
Shameful.

Trump: we are running low on ammo not because of my war on Iran but because Biden gave “massive amounts” of Tomahawks to Ukraine.
The U.S. didn’t supply a single Tomahawk to Ukraine.

Unbelievable. At 9 PM on a Friday night, Trump just waived nearly every sanction the Lindsey Graham bill imposed on Russia. whitehouse.gov/presidential-a…

I am a member of the Norwegian Nobel Committee.

There are five of us. Five people, appointed by a parliament most of the planet could not find on a map, who decide, once a year, which human being the world has agreed to call good.

I know. I know. I think about it on the tram.

We meet in a building on Henrik Ibsens gate, a street named after a man who wrote almost exclusively about people discovering they are frauds, which nobody on the committee finds funny except me. There is a room with a long table and the portraits of the dead laureates looking down, Mandela, the Dalai Lama, a great many earnest men in spectacles, and one portrait we do not discuss, which is Kissinger, 1973, awarded while the bombs were still falling, after which two of our predecessors resigned and the satirist Tom Lehrer said political satire was now obsolete. We keep him on the wall. A reminder. Every family has the uncle.

It is October in Oslo, which means the sun gives up around four in the afternoon like a civil servant, and it rains the particular Norwegian rain that isn’t quite falling, just hanging there, judging you. I arrive with wet shoes. I always arrive with wet shoes. There is coffee, because this is Norway and there is always coffee, we drink more of it per person than almost anyone alive, and someone’s wife has sent kanelboller, the cinnamon buns, and we sit, five Norwegians, damp, caffeinated, sugared, and we decide the moral standing of the entire species.

Let me tell you how it actually works, because the world imagines a cathedral and it is, I promise you, a book club with a mandate.

287 nominations this year. 208 people, 79 organizations. Anyone can nominate, that’s the secret nobody understands: a professor, a parliamentarian, a former laureate, so the “nominee” list is meaningless, it’s a suggestion box, and every autumn some congressman nominates his own golden retriever and the press writes “SHORTLISTED.” Nobody is shortlisted. There is no short list the public ever sees. There is us, and the coffee, and the rain, and the portraits, and a Norwegian stubbornness that is older than the prize itself.

We read reports. The institute’s advisers write them, thick dull documents, and we argue. Our chairman told the BBC once that in the final meeting “there is a high temperature.” High temperature, for a Norwegian, means someone slightly raised an eyebrow and then apologized for it. We don’t do high temperature. We do a long silence, and then Kristin says “well,” and everyone knows exactly what “well” meant, and it’s settled. That’s our shouting. “Well.” You’d have to be raised here to hear the violence in it.

Now. This year. I will not say the name, because we never say the name, but you know the name.

A certain head of state wanted this prize the way a child wants a thing in a shop window, which is to say loudly, and in public, and with the full belief that wanting it was itself the argument. He said he deserved it. He said he’d ended eight wars, a number that grew most times he said it, like a fish. He had other heads of state phone us. Israel’s prime minister posted it on the internet, “Give him the Nobel.” The leaders of Cambodia and Pakistan announced they’d nominated him, as though announcing it were part of it, as though we tally mentions. A man flew around the globe collecting endorsements for a Norwegian committee the way you’d collect signatures for a petition to the council about a noisy dog.

And here, uff da, is the detail I treasure, the one that makes me smile into my coffee. The nomination deadline is the 31st of January. He took office on the 20th. So for all the phone calls, all the posts, all the gilded lobbying, the only nominations that could possibly count for this year’s prize were filed in the first eleven days of his term, before he had, by his own arithmetic, ended a single one of the eight wars. He campaigned all year for a prize whose window had shut while he was still hanging up his coat. We didn’t have to reject him. The calendar did. We just watched. Norwegians are very good at watching. We have long winters.

People think we sit there weighing his deeds. We don’t. That’s the thing I can’t make the world understand. We’re not grading his homework. We don’t owe anyone the prize for a ceasefire, however real, however loud the announcement. “He made peace” is not a sentence that ends in a medal, the way he believes it does, the way he believes every good thing ends in his name on it. The will of a dead Swede says the prize goes to whoever did the most for fraternity between nations. A dead Swede, I should add, who made his entire fortune inventing dynamite and selling arms, and spent his last years horrified at his own obituary, which called him a merchant of death, and so bought his way to immortality as a man of peace. The whole prize is one guilty arms dealer’s attempt to launder his name. We are, all of us, administering a dead man’s public relations. I find this clarifying. It keeps me humble. It should keep everyone humble, and it keeps, by my count, no one humble at all.

So who did we give it to?

An eighty-five-year-old woman. A judge. Born in Durban, under apartheid, granddaughter of a Tamil man who came to South Africa as indentured labor, a bus driver’s daughter from the poor Indian quarter, who became the first non-white woman to run a law practice in her province, who defended Mandela’s people when defending them was dangerous, who sat on the Rwanda tribunal and the court at the Hague, and who, at eighty-five, is right now a judge weighing whether a genocide is a genocide. When we told the world, our chairman said the rule of law “underpins the system we have set up to ensure peace,” and that “peace requires justice.” She wasn’t even in Oslo. She was in Nuremberg. In courtroom 600. The actual room where they tried the Nazis. You cannot stage that. God staged that, and God, it turns out, is a better satirist than any of us.

She did not phone us. She did not post. No prime minister demanded it for her on the internet. She had, as far as our deliberations are concerned, the one qualification the loud man could never manufacture, which is that she wanted the work and not the medal. The medal finds those people. It flees the ones who chase it. This is not a rule we wrote. It’s just the only pattern the hundred-odd years of our mistakes has ever shown.

The reaction from across the ocean was immediate. His spokesman posted that we “place politics over peace.” Ja. Perhaps. We’re five damp pensioners in a rainy city; of course it’s political, it was always political, it was political when we gave it to a sitting American president nine months into his first term for the promise of things he had not yet done, and we have been quietly embarrassed about that one for fifteen years, so believe me, we had a particular reason this year to prefer a woman with fifty years of verdicts behind her over a man with eight wars in front of him and a deadline already behind him.

Here is what he will never understand, the thing I’d tell him on the tram if he ever took one. We are the one prize he cannot buy, cannot post his way to, cannot have a friendly dictator phone in for him. Not because we’re incorruptible, nei, we’re as vain and wrong and human as the portraits on our wall. But because the entire point of the thing, the only power a small cold country’s book club has ever held, is that it goes to the person not performing the wanting. The moment you demand it, you’ve proven you don’t understand what it’s for, and proving that is itself the disqualification. He ran the most expensive campaign in the history of the prize and the campaign was the reason. He was never losing to Navi Pillay. He was losing to the concept.

It’s dark now. Four o’clock dark. The buns are gone. Kristin said “well” an hour ago and we all went home. I’m on the tram with my wet shoes, and somewhere across the water a very powerful man is explaining to a camera that the prize is rigged, that we’re corrupt, that he’ll win it next year, and he genuinely might, we’re only five idiots and we’ve been wrong before, Kissinger is still on the wall.

But not this year. This year an old woman in Nuremberg, in the room where the law once stared down the exact kind of man who thinks wanting a thing loudly enough should make it his, got a phone call she didn’t ask for.

That’s the job. We don’t reward the man who ends the war and announces it.

We reward the woman who spent fifty years deciding what a war was.

He’ll never see the difference. That’s rather the whole point of him.

Takk for i dag. I have to change trams.

Considering the repeated calls to replace Starlink in the EU, followed by the usual snarky comments, mostly from Americans, about how SpaceX is "irreplaceable" and Europe is supposedly incapable of competing, I think it's worth looking at some facts.

First of all, EU countries have launched hundreds of satellites over the past decade, with annual deployments growing from just 16 in 2015 to 135 in 2025. Eutelsat OneWeb already provides continuous coverage across Europe with more than 600 satellites

On top of that, the EU is developing IRIS², a constellation of ~350 satellites, with the first launches scheduled for 2029. The EU's GOVSATCOM programme has already been operational since January 2026, pooling satellite capacity from member states for secure government communications.

Now, let's get to the actual argument. Is Europe behind SpaceX, with its thousands of satellites in orbit? Absolutely. At the moment, it's not even close. Starlink has significantly cheaper consumer terminals, much greater network capacity, a larger constellation and a far more accessible service for ordinary customers. No argument here.

But that's also part of the problem.

Starlink is simply a better and more affordable product for most consumers right now, so customers and government contracts naturally gravitate towards SpaceX, making it harder for European competitors to attract the revenue and investment needed to catch up.

Let's also not pretend SpaceX appeared out of nowhere. It benefited from decades of American aerospace infrastructure, NASA research, publicly funded programs and government contracts, alongside its own substantial private capital

Putting a European startup, or even a single country's space agency, against that entire ecosystem is a losing proposition from the beginning.

But why should it stay that way?

Europe already has the aerospace industry, launch facilities, technological expertise and financial resources to develop a competitive alternative.

To launch satellites successfully and cheap you need to decrease the launch cost. Currently, European rocket Ariane 6 is generally more expensive than Falcon 9, and Europe still lacks a comparable operational reusable launcher. But projects like Themis and Maia are already in development.

If Europe keeps pouring money into SpaceX, how exactly do you expect these European projects to become competitive?

The same applies to satellite terminals. SpaceX has excelled at mass-producing consumer-friendly equipment costing a few hundred dollars, while comparable OneWeb equipment can cost several thousand.

But that advantage comes from economies of scale, production efficiency, mass adoption and, sometimes, subsidising hardware to gain market share. You can't have mass adoption if you mass adopt Starlink

Europe doesn't need to replicate Starlink's entire global network to build a viable alternative. The objective is sufficient coverage, capacity and reliability across Europe and neighbouring regions, not necessarily every random island in the Pacific or remote village in the Brazilian Amazon - something that SpaceX does much better. That's a much more realistic objective than immediately matching Starlink worldwide.

There are several ways to achieve this: direct investment, research funding, initial subsidies, long-term government contracts and procurement policies prioritising European satellite providers wherever feasible, particularly for critical infrastructure.

In strategically sensitive areas, I'd go even further and eliminate dependence on SpaceX entirely wherever a viable European alternative exists.

Which brings us to national security.

Starlink is an American commercial system subject to US jurisdiction, while Starshield is specifically designed for US government and military customers. Starlink's own terms allow the company to suspend services following requests or orders from government agencies.

Now imagine a hypothetical scenario where the US attempts to annex Greenland militarily. Would you really want critical European communications infrastructure dependent on an American company that could could simply switch off everything on political demand? You simply cannot outsource your country's critical communications infrastructure to a foreign provider and pretend there are no strategic risks involved. I don't like writing it, but US is not a reliable partner.

And beyond security, it's also about money and long-term economics.

European money, investment and talent should stay in Europe, not continuously flow to America. Do you want European aerospace graduates to have actual career opportunities in Europe, instead of feeling they need to move to the US?

Do you want European companies building rockets, satellites, manufacturing facilities and research centres, creating skilled jobs and attracting investment?

None of that happens if your entire strategy is to keep buying American Starlink terminals while complaining that European alternatives are too expensive or technologically inferior.

There's a massive difference between saying Europe cannot fully replace Starlink today and claiming that Europe is fundamentally incapable of developing a competitive alternative, while quoting memes about muslim immigrants and plastic bottle caps.

And if Europe keeps financing its competitors instead of building its own capabilities, SpaceX will indeed remain "irreplaceable". Not because Europe can't compete, but because it is not committed to the competition.

I pointed out this apparent paradox years ago, and it becomes even more apparent as midterms loom. A populist doing something so unpopular, yet also so unprincipled and damaging to national interests, must have very powerful motivations.

The sudden introduction by @SpaceX of speed limits to Ukraine’s Starshield (military grade Starlink satellite communications) is puzzling for a number of reasons:

1) It’s a paid for service. SpaceX may be breaching contract. It is certainly demonstrating it is an unreliable provider.

2) The US Department of Defence funds the contracts, so the Trump administration is likely to have been involved in decision. Yet it does not affect Ukraine’s “deep strike” campaign against the Russian diesel production facilities that Trump wants to buy from, or indeed any strikes on Russia, because those drones use a different command and control system.

3) Ukraine had already said it was willing to agree an energy ceasefire, and tried to implement it unilaterally. Putin quickly demonstrated he wasn’t interested . Ukraine has been attacking Russian data centres instead. So why strong-arm Ukraine?

4) It was deliberately done without warning the Ukrainian armed forces, interrupting drone interceptors mid mission and preventing mid-range strikes on moving targets like Russian logistics vehicles.

That doesn’t look like coercive diplomacy, that just looks like handing a battlefield advantage to the Kremlin. It has cost lives.

5) After this, what right minded Nato ally would continue to rely on US military technology?

To get a better understanding of how important this technology and its battlefield impact is, you can watch my new documentary here:

m.youtube.com/watch?v=GR-f-X…

President Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Russian fuel amidst Putin’s ongoing and brutal attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine makes no sense and is a betrayal of the legacy and leadership of the late Senator Lindsey Graham.

While Ukraine fights for its survival, Putin’s war machine continues to prosecute his terrorist war on civilian populations and innocent Ukrainians are dying every day.

Now, Instead of implementing the tough sanctions Lindsey Graham fought to his last breath to enact, President Trump has announced the United States is lifting sanctions on Russian energy, fueling the Putin’s war machine.

As I saw firsthand in Ukraine last month, Putin is losing this war. Ukraine has fought the Russian military to a standstill and reinvented warfare with drones taking the fight into the heart of Russia.

America should not be throwing a lifeline to Putin’s war machine. Now is the time to stand strong against Russian aggression as we did during the first Trump administration.

Putin doesn’t want peace. Putin wants Ukraine. I have no doubt that if Putin overruns Ukraine, it will only be a matter of time until Russia’s military crosses a border that our troops will have to deal with him.

America is the Leader of the Free World. For our National Security, for the security of our Allies in Europe including Ukraine, President Trump should rescind this deal immediately and return to the strong policies of our four years in the White House; impose harsh sanctions on any nation purchasing Russian energy and work with our allies to ensure Ukraine has the military support it needs to repel and defeat this Russian invasion once and for all. Slava Ukraini🇺🇸🇺🇦