How has Russia’s demographic crisis shaped the state’s approach to care and social policy?
Join us on Nov. 10 for a book talk with Inna Leykin, moderated by Russia Program Director Ivan Grek.
📍 Elliott School, GWU | 4 PM
Register now: shorturl.at/jgI4S
Join us on Nov. 10 for a book talk with Inna Leykin, moderated by Russia Program Director Ivan Grek.
📍 Elliott School, GWU | 4 PM
Register now: shorturl.at/jgI4S
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The New York Times’ Anton Troianovski will moderate a discussion with Maria Kuznetsova and Dan Storyev about their new book, How to Survive Authoritarianism, and what Russia’s experience can teach Americans.
📅 Oct. 15, 1–2:30 PM ET | GW
Register: calendar.gwu.edu/event/book-tal…
📅 Oct. 15, 1–2:30 PM ET | GW
Register: calendar.gwu.edu/event/book-tal…
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📚 How can Russia’s experience help Americans recognize authoritarianism?
Join IERES on Oct. 15, 1–2:30 PM ET, for a book talk with Maria Kuznetsova and Dan Storyev, authors of How to Survive Authoritarianism.
Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/book-tal…
Join IERES on Oct. 15, 1–2:30 PM ET, for a book talk with Maria Kuznetsova and Dan Storyev, authors of How to Survive Authoritarianism.
Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/book-tal…
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Join us on September 15 for a book talk with Sergei Chapnin on Religious Communities Under Pressure: The Russian Orthodox Church and the War in Ukraine.
Register here: shorturl.at/dqiQ8
Register here: shorturl.at/dqiQ8
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Join us for an online conference launching the latest special issue of Demokratizatsiya, exploring the Global South’s evolving relationship with Russia after 2022. Moderated by Marlene Laruelle.
Register here: shorturl.at/LqAlt
Register here: shorturl.at/LqAlt
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📝We’ve published the full Digital Methods School tutorial series on YouTube.
AI and prompt engineering, text analysis, and methods for tracking narratives and bot networks on Telegram and VK.
Watch here: youtube.com/playlist?list=…
AI and prompt engineering, text analysis, and methods for tracking narratives and bot networks on Telegram and VK.
Watch here: youtube.com/playlist?list=…
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Russian oil exports have fallen — but not dramatically.
In the observable data, exports dropped from ~7.15 mb/d in June to ~5.54 mb/d in December, then rebounded to ~5.95 mb/d by February. The swing is real, but it’s hard to explain by production alone, and seasonal fuel-oil use ccounting for the full gap.
Source: Sergey Vakulenko / Telegram
In the observable data, exports dropped from ~7.15 mb/d in June to ~5.54 mb/d in December, then rebounded to ~5.95 mb/d by February. The swing is real, but it’s hard to explain by production alone, and seasonal fuel-oil use ccounting for the full gap.
Source: Sergey Vakulenko / Telegram
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📍 Russians’ attitudes toward China, the US, the EU, and Ukraine (January 2026)
Since late last year, Russians’ views of China, the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine have remained largely unchanged. China continues to enjoy consistently positive perceptions eriod of observation.
🇺🇸 Attitudes toward the US are more mixed: just under half of respondents view it negatively, while about a third say they view it positively. The US image improved last year amid attempts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.
🇪🇺 🇺🇦 By contrast, perceptions of the EU and Ukraine have remained predominantly negative over the past four years.
🇨🇳 In January 2026, a majority of respondents said they had a generally positive view of China (83%). One in three (33%) reported a positive view of the US, one in five (21%) of the EU, and one in six (16%) of Ukraine.
Since late last year, Russians’ views of China, the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine have remained largely unchanged. China continues to enjoy consistently positive perceptions eriod of observation.
🇺🇸 Attitudes toward the US are more mixed: just under half of respondents view it negatively, while about a third say they view it positively. The US image improved last year amid attempts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.
🇪🇺 🇺🇦 By contrast, perceptions of the EU and Ukraine have remained predominantly negative over the past four years.
🇨🇳 In January 2026, a majority of respondents said they had a generally positive view of China (83%). One in three (33%) reported a positive view of the US, one in five (21%) of the EU, and one in six (16%) of Ukraine.
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📍 How Returning Veterans Are Driving a Surge in Violent Crime in Russia
➡️ russiapost.info/society/war_co…
A new CEDAR study for The Russia Program finds that nearly 8,000 veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine have been convicted of civilian crimes since 2022 — a growing share of cale: ~8,000 convictions linked to war participants since 2022; about 7,000 were veterans who had already returned home.
🔹 Rising yearly totals: roughly 350 cases identified in 2022, 2,500 in 2023, and 4,700+ in 2024 (2025 figures are incomplete so far).
🔹 Violence & domestic abuse: 900+ veterans prosecuted for violent crimes; 423+ victims killed (including fatal traffic cases). The dataset includes 52 domestic-violence cases targeting partners, children, and other relatives.
🔹 Disproportionate severity: veterans are prosecuted for murder/attempted murder 2.5× more often than men overall, and 2× more often for assaults causing grievous bodily harm.
🔹 Repeat offenders & pardons: at least 2,139 convicted veterans had prior convictions; 656 were pardoned by presidential decree after being recruited from jail to fight.
🔹 Leniency in courts: about one-third of veterans receive more lenient sentences than comparable civilians, often getting fines or labor penalties instead of prison.
The report also stresses these are minimum estimates: not all cases reach court, not all verdicts are published, and data from occupied territories is largely unavailable.
Read full analysis: russiapost.info/society/war_co…
➡️ russiapost.info/society/war_co…
A new CEDAR study for The Russia Program finds that nearly 8,000 veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine have been convicted of civilian crimes since 2022 — a growing share of cale: ~8,000 convictions linked to war participants since 2022; about 7,000 were veterans who had already returned home.
🔹 Rising yearly totals: roughly 350 cases identified in 2022, 2,500 in 2023, and 4,700+ in 2024 (2025 figures are incomplete so far).
🔹 Violence & domestic abuse: 900+ veterans prosecuted for violent crimes; 423+ victims killed (including fatal traffic cases). The dataset includes 52 domestic-violence cases targeting partners, children, and other relatives.
🔹 Disproportionate severity: veterans are prosecuted for murder/attempted murder 2.5× more often than men overall, and 2× more often for assaults causing grievous bodily harm.
🔹 Repeat offenders & pardons: at least 2,139 convicted veterans had prior convictions; 656 were pardoned by presidential decree after being recruited from jail to fight.
🔹 Leniency in courts: about one-third of veterans receive more lenient sentences than comparable civilians, often getting fines or labor penalties instead of prison.
The report also stresses these are minimum estimates: not all cases reach court, not all verdicts are published, and data from occupied territories is largely unavailable.
Read full analysis: russiapost.info/society/war_co…
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📍 New research. Trump’s Peacemaking Rhetoric: Hope, Polarization, and Disillusionment
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemak…
New research from The Russia Program shows that Donald Trump’s peacemaking rhetoric initially raised expectations of a swift end to the Russia–Ukraine war, but arization rather than advancing peace.
▪️ Early optimism was high: Before Trump took office, large majorities in both Russia and Ukraine believed peace depended on his intervention.
▪️ Expectations collapsed quickly when bold promises failed to produce tangible results.
▪️ Polarization increased: Russian public opinion shifted toward greater support for continuing the war, while Ukrainians became more committed to full territorial liberation and less open to compromise.
▪️ Trust in Trump as a mediator remained low, with many viewing him as biased or driven by U.S. interests.
▪️ Media framing mattered: Russian state media promoted selective visions of “peace,” reinforcing skepticism toward direct negotiations with Ukraine.
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemak…
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemak…
New research from The Russia Program shows that Donald Trump’s peacemaking rhetoric initially raised expectations of a swift end to the Russia–Ukraine war, but arization rather than advancing peace.
▪️ Early optimism was high: Before Trump took office, large majorities in both Russia and Ukraine believed peace depended on his intervention.
▪️ Expectations collapsed quickly when bold promises failed to produce tangible results.
▪️ Polarization increased: Russian public opinion shifted toward greater support for continuing the war, while Ukrainians became more committed to full territorial liberation and less open to compromise.
▪️ Trust in Trump as a mediator remained low, with many viewing him as biased or driven by U.S. interests.
▪️ Media framing mattered: Russian state media promoted selective visions of “peace,” reinforcing skepticism toward direct negotiations with Ukraine.
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemak…
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🚨 New research. Outsourcing Social Policy, Controlling Civil Society: Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/russias_presid…
Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund has become the main source of NGO financing since 2017. It fills real social-service gaps and provides rapid also centralizes state control over civil society.
Most funding goes to a small group of established NGOs, while new or independent groups rarely break through. As foreign funding has been restricted, PGF now shapes which projects — and which narratives — are allowed to thrive, often aligning with government priorities.
The result: a civil society that exists, but largely on the state’s terms.
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/russias_presid…
Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund has become the main source of NGO financing since 2017. It fills real social-service gaps and provides rapid also centralizes state control over civil society.
Most funding goes to a small group of established NGOs, while new or independent groups rarely break through. As foreign funding has been restricted, PGF now shapes which projects — and which narratives — are allowed to thrive, often aligning with government priorities.
The result: a civil society that exists, but largely on the state’s terms.
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Heading to the 2025 ASEEES Convention in DC?
Join GW’s IERES for an evening reception celebrating our community of scholars & professionals! Cosponsored by ASEEES—come reconnect, meet new colleagues, and chat with IERES faculty, staff, and visiting scholars. Snacks, desserts & drinks (cash bar) provided.
Join GW’s IERES for an evening reception celebrating our community of scholars & professionals! Cosponsored by ASEEES—come reconnect, meet new colleagues, and chat with IERES faculty, staff, and visiting scholars. Snacks, desserts & drinks (cash bar) provided.
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Join us for Echoes of Tomorrow: Russia’s War, Society, and Ideas of Change on Nov 18 at George Washington University (1957 E St NW, Washington DC) — a deep dive into how war, society and vision converge in Russia today.
With round-table and panel sessions exploring ideas of the ar demography, economic shifts & anti-war petitions.
Free and open to all.
Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/echoes-o…
@IERES_GWU
With round-table and panel sessions exploring ideas of the ar demography, economic shifts & anti-war petitions.
Free and open to all.
Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/echoes-o…
@IERES_GWU
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Attending the 2025 Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) Annual Convention in Washington, DC?
Join the @IERES_GWU for an evening reception celebrating our vibrant community of scholars and professionals. Cosponsored by ASEEES, this event is a o reconnect with colleagues, make new connections, and engage with IERES faculty, staff, visiting scholars, alumni, and colleagues worldwide.
And don’t forget to stop by the IERES booth (#213) in the Exhibition Hall! Meet our faculty and staff, explore our latest research, publications, and events, and learn about opportunities for scholars and students to study and collaborate with us at IERES.
Register here: shorturl.at/IGwt9
Join the @IERES_GWU for an evening reception celebrating our vibrant community of scholars and professionals. Cosponsored by ASEEES, this event is a o reconnect with colleagues, make new connections, and engage with IERES faculty, staff, visiting scholars, alumni, and colleagues worldwide.
And don’t forget to stop by the IERES booth (#213) in the Exhibition Hall! Meet our faculty and staff, explore our latest research, publications, and events, and learn about opportunities for scholars and students to study and collaborate with us at IERES.
Register here: shorturl.at/IGwt9
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📢 Join us at the next CORUSCANT seminar in Paris!
🗓️ Wed 19 Nov, 4–6PM (Condorcet Campus + online)
Dr Annamaria Kiss (Queen Mary University of London) will discuss how Russia framed and used foreign fighters in its discourse and policy on Syria.
Discussant: Dr Anne Le Huérou.
d online: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAI…
More details here: coruscant.therussiaprogram.org/tpost/ou8rkp1o…
🗓️ Wed 19 Nov, 4–6PM (Condorcet Campus + online)
Dr Annamaria Kiss (Queen Mary University of London) will discuss how Russia framed and used foreign fighters in its discourse and policy on Syria.
Discussant: Dr Anne Le Huérou.
d online: docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAI…
More details here: coruscant.therussiaprogram.org/tpost/ou8rkp1o…
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Estimating the Real Size of Russia’s Mobilization Reserve
Based on publicly available data, the size of Russia’s mobilization reserve appears to be far smaller than some official estimates suggest.
According to Kommersant [1], the government allocates around 14 billion rubles bilization reserve. Meanwhile, News .ru [2] reports that reservists receive between 4,000 and 10,000 rubles per month.
If we divide the total annual funding by these monthly payments, the number of reservists ranges from roughly 116,000 to 291,000 people. This calculation does not account for training costs, bonuses, or other additional payments, which would further reduce the figure.
Even allowing for these variables, the data indicates that the mobilization reserve is nowhere near the 2 million people mentioned by some lawmakers [2].
[1] — kommersant.ru/doc/7196955
[2] — news.ru/society/pro-za…
Based on publicly available data, the size of Russia’s mobilization reserve appears to be far smaller than some official estimates suggest.
According to Kommersant [1], the government allocates around 14 billion rubles bilization reserve. Meanwhile, News .ru [2] reports that reservists receive between 4,000 and 10,000 rubles per month.
If we divide the total annual funding by these monthly payments, the number of reservists ranges from roughly 116,000 to 291,000 people. This calculation does not account for training costs, bonuses, or other additional payments, which would further reduce the figure.
Even allowing for these variables, the data indicates that the mobilization reserve is nowhere near the 2 million people mentioned by some lawmakers [2].
[1] — kommersant.ru/doc/7196955
[2] — news.ru/society/pro-za…
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In “Illiberalism, Putin & the Politics of Religion,” Marlene Laruelle unpacks how the Kremlin fuses nationalism, Eurasianism & Orthodox identity to undergird its illiberal project—and what that means for Russia’s future & the war in Ukraine.
Listen here
ralphbuncheinstitute.org/illiberalism-p…
Listen here
ralphbuncheinstitute.org/illiberalism-p…
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📢 Event: From Russia with Love — Corruption & Sanctions Bypass in the Ukraine War
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fueled new corruption and sanctions-evasion networks. Join experts to explore how regime elites move money, bypass restrictions, and how civil society pushes back.
✅ R.co/jijpHLcAF9
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fueled new corruption and sanctions-evasion networks. Join experts to explore how regime elites move money, bypass restrictions, and how civil society pushes back.
✅ R.co/jijpHLcAF9
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What do Russians actually read for news—and where can independent outlets break through?
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/read_for_news
Alesya Sokolova’s latest policy study (Sept. 3, 2025) uncovers a striking divide: 44% of Telegram users follow pro-government channels, while just 14% follow here’s the silver lining: “neutral” channels—those not fully aligned with either camp—are gaining traction and could offer independent media a vital path to moderate audiences.
The takeaway? To expand reach in today’s constrained media landscape, independent outlets should lean into Telegram—with content tailored to the middle ground—and build trust through credibility, transparency, and strategic partnerships.
Read the analysis: therussiaprogram.org/read_for_news
➡️ therussiaprogram.org/read_for_news
Alesya Sokolova’s latest policy study (Sept. 3, 2025) uncovers a striking divide: 44% of Telegram users follow pro-government channels, while just 14% follow here’s the silver lining: “neutral” channels—those not fully aligned with either camp—are gaining traction and could offer independent media a vital path to moderate audiences.
The takeaway? To expand reach in today’s constrained media landscape, independent outlets should lean into Telegram—with content tailored to the middle ground—and build trust through credibility, transparency, and strategic partnerships.
Read the analysis: therussiaprogram.org/read_for_news
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📢 New Research. From Wages to Loyalty: How Economics Fuels Political Allegiance in Russia
therussiaprogram.org/from_wages_to_…
Ever wondered how economic policy subtly shapes public loyalty?
A recent analysis reveals a striking trend: from 2021 to 2024, Russia’s personal income tax (PIT) with the sharpest single-year growth—27%—in 2023. Corporate Income Tax (CIT) also surged in 2023 before slightly dipping in 2024.
Yet, interestingly, tax rates themselves remained untouched during this span—so what's driving this surge? The study suggests robust economic activity, particularly in some regional sectors, is a key factor in bolstering tax revenues and reinforcing local budgets.
Here's the fascinating part: this economic momentum appears to translate into political support. People may not always feel fully optimistic, but as incomes rise or stabilize, the link between wages and political loyalty becomes more tangible—pragmatism over ideology.
What does this mean for understanding support systems in authoritarian regimes? It's not always about coercion or propaganda—sometimes it's about tangible material benefits that keep the system stable, even amid uncertainty.
therussiaprogram.org/from_wages_to_…
therussiaprogram.org/from_wages_to_…
Ever wondered how economic policy subtly shapes public loyalty?
A recent analysis reveals a striking trend: from 2021 to 2024, Russia’s personal income tax (PIT) with the sharpest single-year growth—27%—in 2023. Corporate Income Tax (CIT) also surged in 2023 before slightly dipping in 2024.
Yet, interestingly, tax rates themselves remained untouched during this span—so what's driving this surge? The study suggests robust economic activity, particularly in some regional sectors, is a key factor in bolstering tax revenues and reinforcing local budgets.
Here's the fascinating part: this economic momentum appears to translate into political support. People may not always feel fully optimistic, but as incomes rise or stabilize, the link between wages and political loyalty becomes more tangible—pragmatism over ideology.
What does this mean for understanding support systems in authoritarian regimes? It's not always about coercion or propaganda—sometimes it's about tangible material benefits that keep the system stable, even amid uncertainty.
therussiaprogram.org/from_wages_to_…
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📢 New Research Paper. Russia & Iran: Tactical Allies, Strategic Rivals in Syria?
👉 therussiaprogram.org/diverging_alli…
Since 2015, Russia and Iran have propped up Assad’s regime side-by-side. But beneath their battlefield cooperation lies a growing rift.
🔹 Russia wants a stable, centmilitary bases, reconstruction deals, and global leverage.
🔹 Iran aims to entrench its influence through militias, ideology, and a “resistance axis” stretching to Lebanon.
Despite appearances, their alliance was never built to last—it’s a marriage of convenience, not shared vision. From diverging strategies to tensions over Israel and economic competition, the cracks are widening.
📊 Our new report from breaks it down:
“Diverging Allies in Syria: Russia’s and Iran’s Grand Strategies”
👉 therussiaprogram.org/diverging_alli…
Why it matters: These fractures could reshape Syria’s post-war future—and shift the balance of power across the region.
👉 therussiaprogram.org/diverging_alli…
Since 2015, Russia and Iran have propped up Assad’s regime side-by-side. But beneath their battlefield cooperation lies a growing rift.
🔹 Russia wants a stable, centmilitary bases, reconstruction deals, and global leverage.
🔹 Iran aims to entrench its influence through militias, ideology, and a “resistance axis” stretching to Lebanon.
Despite appearances, their alliance was never built to last—it’s a marriage of convenience, not shared vision. From diverging strategies to tensions over Israel and economic competition, the cracks are widening.
📊 Our new report from breaks it down:
“Diverging Allies in Syria: Russia’s and Iran’s Grand Strategies”
👉 therussiaprogram.org/diverging_alli…
Why it matters: These fractures could reshape Syria’s post-war future—and shift the balance of power across the region.
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🚀 New Research Paper : The Rise of Soviet Asian and African Studies in the Era of Decolonization
🔗 therussiaprogram.org/onlinepaper_17
Just published by The Russia Program at GW. Our new research dives into the emergence and evolution of Soviet-era academic engagement with Asia and ovoking study explores:
• How Soviet scholars framed the Global South within ideological, political, and scholarly narratives
• The ripple effects of these frameworks on Cold War diplomacy, decolonization, and Soviet soft power
• Lessons for today: what historical scholarship on Asia–Africa can tell us about Russia’s current global strategy
Perfect for anyone passionate about area studies, Cold War history, or rethinking Russia’s overseas posture. Check out the full free paper and enrich your understanding of Russia’s intellectual and geopolitical outreach.
🔗 therussiaprogram.org/onlinepaper_17
🔗 therussiaprogram.org/onlinepaper_17
Just published by The Russia Program at GW. Our new research dives into the emergence and evolution of Soviet-era academic engagement with Asia and ovoking study explores:
• How Soviet scholars framed the Global South within ideological, political, and scholarly narratives
• The ripple effects of these frameworks on Cold War diplomacy, decolonization, and Soviet soft power
• Lessons for today: what historical scholarship on Asia–Africa can tell us about Russia’s current global strategy
Perfect for anyone passionate about area studies, Cold War history, or rethinking Russia’s overseas posture. Check out the full free paper and enrich your understanding of Russia’s intellectual and geopolitical outreach.
🔗 therussiaprogram.org/onlinepaper_17
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💼🇷🇺 "Doing business in 1990s Russia? You didn’t just need a lawyer—you needed a bodyguard."
therussiaprogram.org/satinsky_archi…
After the Soviet collapse, Western businessmen rushed into Russia chasing gold-rush opportunities. What they found was a jungle of mafia clans, bribes, and ction? You needed a "krysha"—a “cover” from mobsters or corrupt officials.
💰 Deals weren’t closed in boardrooms—they were negotiated over vodka, under threat.
🔫 One U.S. investor was gunned down outside his hotel for challenging the wrong people.
It wasn’t just business—it was survival.
The boldest didn’t just invest. They adapted. Aligned with power. Navigated the shadows.
Watch and read the interviews about the early days of capitalism in Russia here: therussiaprogram.org/satinsky_archi…
therussiaprogram.org/satinsky_archi…
After the Soviet collapse, Western businessmen rushed into Russia chasing gold-rush opportunities. What they found was a jungle of mafia clans, bribes, and ction? You needed a "krysha"—a “cover” from mobsters or corrupt officials.
💰 Deals weren’t closed in boardrooms—they were negotiated over vodka, under threat.
🔫 One U.S. investor was gunned down outside his hotel for challenging the wrong people.
It wasn’t just business—it was survival.
The boldest didn’t just invest. They adapted. Aligned with power. Navigated the shadows.
Watch and read the interviews about the early days of capitalism in Russia here: therussiaprogram.org/satinsky_archi…
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🚨 Sharp Rise in Politicized Prosecutions in Russia
New data from our research reveals a chilling trend: Russia is dramatically expanding its use of criminal law to suppress dissent.
therussiaprogram.org/politicized_law
🔺 "Inciting terrorism or justification of such" (Art. 205.2) cases to 453 in 2024 — a nearly 4x increase.
🧾 The number of cases under laws like:
▪️ “Inciting extremist activity” (Art. 280)
▪️ “Fakes about the military” (Art. 207.3)
▪️ “Rehabilitation of Nazism” (Art. 354.1)
have all spiked since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
📈 These charges, often vaguely defined, allow authorities to:
▪️ Silence anti-war voices
▪️ Criminalize political expression
▪️ Target critics under the guise of national security
🔎 According to our research, these prosecutions represent a systemic weaponization of the legal system — transforming courts into tools of political repression.
See full analysis here: therussiaprogram.org/politicized_law
New data from our research reveals a chilling trend: Russia is dramatically expanding its use of criminal law to suppress dissent.
therussiaprogram.org/politicized_law
🔺 "Inciting terrorism or justification of such" (Art. 205.2) cases to 453 in 2024 — a nearly 4x increase.
🧾 The number of cases under laws like:
▪️ “Inciting extremist activity” (Art. 280)
▪️ “Fakes about the military” (Art. 207.3)
▪️ “Rehabilitation of Nazism” (Art. 354.1)
have all spiked since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
📈 These charges, often vaguely defined, allow authorities to:
▪️ Silence anti-war voices
▪️ Criminalize political expression
▪️ Target critics under the guise of national security
🔎 According to our research, these prosecutions represent a systemic weaponization of the legal system — transforming courts into tools of political repression.
See full analysis here: therussiaprogram.org/politicized_law
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🚨New research paper. How law in Russia has evolved into a tool of authoritarian governance?
Russian law enforcement has become a tool of statecraft—not just crime-fighting. From branding NGOs as “foreign agents” and “undesirable” to silencing independent media, religion, and legal system is wielded like a political weapon.
📌 2022 “war censorship” laws criminalize “discrediting” the military, with over 10,000 prosecuted
📌 The foreign-agent law targets NGOs, media, journalists—even individuals—for minimal foreign ties|
📌 Anti‑LGBT and extremism laws suppress dissent under the guise of protecting “traditional values”
Read the comprehensive analysis: therussiaprogram.org/politicized_law
Russian law enforcement has become a tool of statecraft—not just crime-fighting. From branding NGOs as “foreign agents” and “undesirable” to silencing independent media, religion, and legal system is wielded like a political weapon.
📌 2022 “war censorship” laws criminalize “discrediting” the military, with over 10,000 prosecuted
📌 The foreign-agent law targets NGOs, media, journalists—even individuals—for minimal foreign ties|
📌 Anti‑LGBT and extremism laws suppress dissent under the guise of protecting “traditional values”
Read the comprehensive analysis: therussiaprogram.org/politicized_law
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The Use of Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Russian Public Opinion Shifts
Russians are now significantly less likely to believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine could be justified. Currently, only 24% of respondents say it could be justified — a notable decline from 39% one ublic opposition to the idea has grown sharply. Today, 65% of Russians say that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine cannot be justified, compared to just 45% who felt that way a year ago.
This shift suggests a growing skepticism within Russian society about escalating the conflict to the nuclear level.
Russians are now significantly less likely to believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine could be justified. Currently, only 24% of respondents say it could be justified — a notable decline from 39% one ublic opposition to the idea has grown sharply. Today, 65% of Russians say that the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine cannot be justified, compared to just 45% who felt that way a year ago.
This shift suggests a growing skepticism within Russian society about escalating the conflict to the nuclear level.
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🗳 Levada Center Survey: Russians on the Iran-Israel Conflict.
A new poll conducted in June 2025 shows how Russians view the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel:
🔹 61% of respondents said they support neither side.
🔸 29% expressed sympathy for Iran.
🔷 Only 3% sided with ided.
These numbers reflect a strong tendency toward neutrality or support for Iran among the Russian population
A new poll conducted in June 2025 shows how Russians view the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel:
🔹 61% of respondents said they support neither side.
🔸 29% expressed sympathy for Iran.
🔷 Only 3% sided with ided.
These numbers reflect a strong tendency toward neutrality or support for Iran among the Russian population
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Russians are increasingly viewing Donald Trump in a positive light — a sharp shift from the end of his first term, when over a third saw him negatively.
Source: FOM poll
Source: FOM poll
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Life satisfaction in Russia hits a new record:
🔹 89% of Russians say they’re satisfied with their lives
🔻 Only 10% are dissatisfied
Satisfaction has steadily grown — from 59% in Feb 2000 to 89% in April 2024
Source: Levada-Center
🔹 89% of Russians say they’re satisfied with their lives
🔻 Only 10% are dissatisfied
Satisfaction has steadily grown — from 59% in Feb 2000 to 89% in April 2024
Source: Levada-Center
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📢 Calling displaced scholars!
Join STEP U.S. practical workshop on applying for academic grants 🎓💡
🗓️ Learn how to find the right opportunities
🛠️ Get tips to craft competitive proposals
📚 Perfect for early- & mid-career scholars
🔗 Register now: us06web.zoom.us/meeting/regist…
Join STEP U.S. practical workshop on applying for academic grants 🎓💡
🗓️ Learn how to find the right opportunities
🛠️ Get tips to craft competitive proposals
📚 Perfect for early- & mid-career scholars
🔗 Register now: us06web.zoom.us/meeting/regist…
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📊 Do Russians support unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine?
According to a May 2025 Levada poll:
🔴 73% of Russians believe the conflict in Ukraine should end only after addressing its root causes
🔵 18% support a ceasefire first, then resolving other issues
🕊️ 87% support peace d Kyiv held in Istanbul on May 16 (before the airbase attacks)
🚫 Only 6% oppose negotiations
According to a May 2025 Levada poll:
🔴 73% of Russians believe the conflict in Ukraine should end only after addressing its root causes
🔵 18% support a ceasefire first, then resolving other issues
🕊️ 87% support peace d Kyiv held in Istanbul on May 16 (before the airbase attacks)
🚫 Only 6% oppose negotiations
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Over 25 Years, Russians’ Perception of Their Country’s Global Standing Has Dramatically Shifted
🔹 In 2000, more than half of Russians believed their country ranked in the "lower half" of global development.
— 18% considered Russia one of the world’s most underdeveloped it was a country “with below-average development.”
Another 30% viewed Russia as having an average level of development.
Only 6% believed Russia was among the top 10 most developed countries — including just 1% who thought it was themost advanced and progressive nation.
🔹 By 2025, the picture is completely different.
— 55% now believe Russia is among the top 10 developed countries.
— 14% even consider it the most advanced and progressive country in the world.
Only 7% still think Russia lags behind — with just 2% calling it one of the most underdeveloped nations.
Public opinion has shifted from modest realism to confident optimism.
📊 Source: VTsIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center), “Russia Day 2025”
🔹 In 2000, more than half of Russians believed their country ranked in the "lower half" of global development.
— 18% considered Russia one of the world’s most underdeveloped it was a country “with below-average development.”
Another 30% viewed Russia as having an average level of development.
Only 6% believed Russia was among the top 10 most developed countries — including just 1% who thought it was themost advanced and progressive nation.
🔹 By 2025, the picture is completely different.
— 55% now believe Russia is among the top 10 developed countries.
— 14% even consider it the most advanced and progressive country in the world.
Only 7% still think Russia lags behind — with just 2% calling it one of the most underdeveloped nations.
Public opinion has shifted from modest realism to confident optimism.
📊 Source: VTsIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center), “Russia Day 2025”
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🎧 Listen to a fascinating episode of a podcast from New Books Network featuring Marlene Laruelle’s new book, Ideology and Meaning-Making under the Putin Regime.
Dr. Laruelle argues that Putinism isn’t just propaganda or power politics — it’s a coherent, evolving ideology rooted , Orthodox tradition, and post-Soviet memory politics. This ideology shapes not only media and education, but also how the state justifies its actions — including war.
🎙️ Listen here: newbooksnetwork.com/ideology-and-m…
Dr. Laruelle argues that Putinism isn’t just propaganda or power politics — it’s a coherent, evolving ideology rooted , Orthodox tradition, and post-Soviet memory politics. This ideology shapes not only media and education, but also how the state justifies its actions — including war.
🎙️ Listen here: newbooksnetwork.com/ideology-and-m…
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Marlene Laruelle joined the podcast "Ideology and Meaning-Making under Putin" to unpack how the Kremlin builds its worldview through nationalism and traditional values.
A must-listen for anyone exploring Russia’s ideological landscape.
🎧 youtube.com/watch?v=ibdt0N…
A must-listen for anyone exploring Russia’s ideological landscape.
🎧 youtube.com/watch?v=ibdt0N…
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Russia and Iran propped up Assad together — but behind the scenes, it was a contest for influence.
From rival militias to reconstruction deals, Tehran steadily edged out Moscow. Our report unpacks a decade of uneasy alliance.
Read it here: therussiaprogram.org/competing_alli…
From rival militias to reconstruction deals, Tehran steadily edged out Moscow. Our report unpacks a decade of uneasy alliance.
Read it here: therussiaprogram.org/competing_alli…
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Looking Back: The Russia Program Annual Conference 2025
Our Conference, held on April 18 at George Washington University brought together a dynamic community of scholars and practitioners to explore the evolving landscape of Russian studies amid ongoing conflict.
The conference els on digital methodologies, the complexities of a semi-closed Russian society, and the nation's shifting global relationships. Highlights included discussions on big data analyses of Russian civil society, the challenges of conducting research under increasing state secrecy, and the Kremlin's strategic narratives in the Global South.
The event not only provided a platform for rigorous academic discourse but also fostered meaningful connections among attendees. As we reflect on the day's rich exchanges, we're reminded of the importance of collaborative inquiry in understanding Russia's multifaceted role in the world today.
Our Conference, held on April 18 at George Washington University brought together a dynamic community of scholars and practitioners to explore the evolving landscape of Russian studies amid ongoing conflict.
The conference els on digital methodologies, the complexities of a semi-closed Russian society, and the nation's shifting global relationships. Highlights included discussions on big data analyses of Russian civil society, the challenges of conducting research under increasing state secrecy, and the Kremlin's strategic narratives in the Global South.
The event not only provided a platform for rigorous academic discourse but also fostered meaningful connections among attendees. As we reflect on the day's rich exchanges, we're reminded of the importance of collaborative inquiry in understanding Russia's multifaceted role in the world today.
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📊 What do Russian think about the peace negotiations?
A recent Levada Center survey reveals that while 60% of Russians support peace talks to end the war in Ukraine, they insist on negotiating from a position of strength. Many pin hopes on Trump’s return, believing he could are willing to concede any territory. The desire for peace is rising—but not at any cost.
Read the analysis here: russiapost.info/society/leaders
A recent Levada Center survey reveals that while 60% of Russians support peace talks to end the war in Ukraine, they insist on negotiating from a position of strength. Many pin hopes on Trump’s return, believing he could are willing to concede any territory. The desire for peace is rising—but not at any cost.
Read the analysis here: russiapost.info/society/leaders
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Will the Istanbul Agreements Shape Future Peace Talks?
Back in March 2022, as the full-scale war raged on, Russia and Ukraine came close to a peace deal in Istanbul. The talks ultimately failed—but the proposals laid out there could still have a major influence on how this war ore of the Istanbul agreements included:
– Ukraine committing to neutrality (no NATO, but strong international security guarantees)
– Special status and autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk, within Ukraine’s borders
– Deferring any final decision on Crimea’s status for up to 15 years
– Future limits and agreements on Ukraine’s military capabilities
These ideas weren’t implemented, but they haven’t disappeared. In fact, many analysts believe they’re likely to resurface when serious peace negotiations resume.
History shows that old frameworks often come back into play. The Istanbul blueprint could well be the basis for whatever agreement comes next.
📖 Full analysis here: russiapost.info/politics/agree…
Back in March 2022, as the full-scale war raged on, Russia and Ukraine came close to a peace deal in Istanbul. The talks ultimately failed—but the proposals laid out there could still have a major influence on how this war ore of the Istanbul agreements included:
– Ukraine committing to neutrality (no NATO, but strong international security guarantees)
– Special status and autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk, within Ukraine’s borders
– Deferring any final decision on Crimea’s status for up to 15 years
– Future limits and agreements on Ukraine’s military capabilities
These ideas weren’t implemented, but they haven’t disappeared. In fact, many analysts believe they’re likely to resurface when serious peace negotiations resume.
History shows that old frameworks often come back into play. The Istanbul blueprint could well be the basis for whatever agreement comes next.
📖 Full analysis here: russiapost.info/politics/agree…
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How is Russian society adapting to wartime life?
Join us for a talk by Dr. Zvonovsky on public opinion, social change, and life under conflict.
Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/how-russ…
@IERES_GWU
#Russia #GWU #WartimeSociety
Join us for a talk by Dr. Zvonovsky on public opinion, social change, and life under conflict.
Register here: calendar.gwu.edu/event/how-russ…
@IERES_GWU
#Russia #GWU #WartimeSociety
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🚨 New research. Power Struggles Behind the Scenes in Syria: Russia vs. Iran
therussiaprogram.org/competing_alli…
The article “Competing Allies: How Russia and Iran Jousted for Influence over the Syrian Armed Forces (2015–2024)” by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi dives into a behind-the-scenes called allies. While they both backed Assad, their visions for Syria clashed dramatically.
🔑 Key Highlights:
Russia and Iran appeared united in supporting Assad — but beneath the surface, it was a tug-of-war for dominance in Syria’s military and economy.
🇷🇺 Russia wanted a centralized, professional Syrian army loyal to the state.
🇮🇷 Iran pushed for decentralized militias loyal to Tehran — creating a patchwork of loyalist fighters.
💰Economic influence was just as critical: both countries scrambled to lock down lucrative reconstruction deals and key industries in Syria.
Iran gained the upper hand in influence — but lacked the resources to stabilize Syria long-term, leaving a brittle regime propped up by conflicting foreign interests.
This isn’t just about Syria — it’s a case study in how international “partners” often pursue sharply different goals, even while appearing aligned.
🔗 Read the full analysis: therussiaprogram.org/competing_alli…
therussiaprogram.org/competing_alli…
The article “Competing Allies: How Russia and Iran Jousted for Influence over the Syrian Armed Forces (2015–2024)” by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi dives into a behind-the-scenes called allies. While they both backed Assad, their visions for Syria clashed dramatically.
🔑 Key Highlights:
Russia and Iran appeared united in supporting Assad — but beneath the surface, it was a tug-of-war for dominance in Syria’s military and economy.
🇷🇺 Russia wanted a centralized, professional Syrian army loyal to the state.
🇮🇷 Iran pushed for decentralized militias loyal to Tehran — creating a patchwork of loyalist fighters.
💰Economic influence was just as critical: both countries scrambled to lock down lucrative reconstruction deals and key industries in Syria.
Iran gained the upper hand in influence — but lacked the resources to stabilize Syria long-term, leaving a brittle regime propped up by conflicting foreign interests.
This isn’t just about Syria — it’s a case study in how international “partners” often pursue sharply different goals, even while appearing aligned.
🔗 Read the full analysis: therussiaprogram.org/competing_alli…
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“Everything was uncertain, but intensely alive.” – Henrik Winther on Russia in the 1990s
In our latest feature from the #satinskyarchives Project, Danish entrepreneur Henrik Winther reflects on his unforgettable years living and working in post-Soviet Russia. From navigating a essing the raw spirit of a society in transition, Winther’s memories capture a pivotal era marked by both turbulence and possibility.
"It was a time when everything seemed possible—and nothing was guaranteed."
Watch the full interview here: therussiaprogram.org/henrik_winther
The Satinsky Archives Project is dedicated to preserving first-hand accounts of life in Russia during the 1990s—a decade that shaped a generation and left a lasting imprint on the world.
🎯 Help us keep these stories alive.
Join our fundraising campaign to support more interviews, translations, and historical research. Every contribution brings us closer to capturing this complex and transformative period in history.
👉 Donate now and be part of the story: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
In our latest feature from the #satinskyarchives Project, Danish entrepreneur Henrik Winther reflects on his unforgettable years living and working in post-Soviet Russia. From navigating a essing the raw spirit of a society in transition, Winther’s memories capture a pivotal era marked by both turbulence and possibility.
"It was a time when everything seemed possible—and nothing was guaranteed."
Watch the full interview here: therussiaprogram.org/henrik_winther
The Satinsky Archives Project is dedicated to preserving first-hand accounts of life in Russia during the 1990s—a decade that shaped a generation and left a lasting imprint on the world.
🎯 Help us keep these stories alive.
Join our fundraising campaign to support more interviews, translations, and historical research. Every contribution brings us closer to capturing this complex and transformative period in history.
👉 Donate now and be part of the story: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
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Russians are in record-high spirits.
A recent survey by Levada Center shows that 20% of Russians say they’re in a great mood — that’s the highest level since the 1990s! Just in January, it was only 12%.
The majority (63%) feel okay or neutral.
Only 16% report a bad mood — his year.
Young people (under 40) are leading the positivity wave — 40% of them say they’re feeling great, which is twice the national average.
🏙 Meanwhile, Muscovites are less likely to say their mood is great… but also much less likely to feel bad (only 8%).
A recent survey by Levada Center shows that 20% of Russians say they’re in a great mood — that’s the highest level since the 1990s! Just in January, it was only 12%.
The majority (63%) feel okay or neutral.
Only 16% report a bad mood — his year.
Young people (under 40) are leading the positivity wave — 40% of them say they’re feeling great, which is twice the national average.
🏙 Meanwhile, Muscovites are less likely to say their mood is great… but also much less likely to feel bad (only 8%).
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Want to know if Russia is getting ready for peace? Follow the money—specifically, the grants.
Beyond the headlines and diplomatic speeches, one of the clearest signals of Russia’s intentions lies in an unexpected place: state funding for NGOs.
The Presidential Grants trolled by the Kremlin, quietly shifts funding priorities to match the government's strategic goals. Right now, the share of grants supporting veterans is still small—but history tells us that's likely to change if Moscow starts preparing for demobilization.
A sudden surge in grants for veteran reintegration—job training, mental health services, housing—would be a strong sign that Russia is gearing up for a long pause, or even an end, to active conflict in Ukraine.
Analysts and policymakers, take note: The best clues about Russia’s next move might not come from the battlefield or the Kremlin—but from the grant announcements.
Peace, if it’s coming, will be funded first.
More details in our newsletter: drive.google.com/file/d/1TNbQmm…
Beyond the headlines and diplomatic speeches, one of the clearest signals of Russia’s intentions lies in an unexpected place: state funding for NGOs.
The Presidential Grants trolled by the Kremlin, quietly shifts funding priorities to match the government's strategic goals. Right now, the share of grants supporting veterans is still small—but history tells us that's likely to change if Moscow starts preparing for demobilization.
A sudden surge in grants for veteran reintegration—job training, mental health services, housing—would be a strong sign that Russia is gearing up for a long pause, or even an end, to active conflict in Ukraine.
Analysts and policymakers, take note: The best clues about Russia’s next move might not come from the battlefield or the Kremlin—but from the grant announcements.
Peace, if it’s coming, will be funded first.
More details in our newsletter: drive.google.com/file/d/1TNbQmm…
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Russia’s Presidential Grants Foundation is quietly signaling shifts in Kremlin strategy.
Tracking NGO funding priorities — especially around veteran support — could reveal if Moscow is preparing for peace in Ukraine. Read the analysis in the newest edition of our newsletter: drive.google.com/file/d/1TNbQmm…
Tracking NGO funding priorities — especially around veteran support — could reveal if Moscow is preparing for peace in Ukraine. Read the analysis in the newest edition of our newsletter: drive.google.com/file/d/1TNbQmm…
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The number of Russians regularly using VPN services has doubled since 2022.
Today, over a third of Russians – 36% – use VPNs, with 20% using them regularly. A year ago, around a quarter – 25% – reported using VPNs, and only 11% used them regularly.
✔️ Among Russians under 40, s.
Russians mainly turn to VPNs to access blocked websites, social media platforms, independent news outlets, and streaming services restricted within the country.
📊 Based on surveys by the Levada Center
Today, over a third of Russians – 36% – use VPNs, with 20% using them regularly. A year ago, around a quarter – 25% – reported using VPNs, and only 11% used them regularly.
✔️ Among Russians under 40, s.
Russians mainly turn to VPNs to access blocked websites, social media platforms, independent news outlets, and streaming services restricted within the country.
📊 Based on surveys by the Levada Center
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We’re excited to share the another interview from the #satinskyarchives: an in-depth interview with Manana Aslamazyan, who was a leading figure in Russian independent media and civil society. In this powerful conversation, Manana reflects on her decades of work supporting press values in Russia — and the challenges she’s faced along the way.
Manana Aslamazyan was unfortunately struck by a car in Yerevan and died shortly after being interviewed on December 7, 2021. We include this interview to honor her and the important role she played in independent media in post-Soviet Russia, as will be clear from the interview.
📖 Watch/read the full interview here:
👉 therussiaprogram.org/manana_aslamaz…
🗂️ The Satinsky Archives Project preserves the voices of Russia’s civil society leaders, activists, and independent thinkers—people who have shaped the country’s democratic movements and resisted authoritarianism, often at great personal cost.
💡 To keep the project going and expand this important oral history collection, we’ve launched a crowdfunding campaign. Your support helps us record, translate, and share more of these critical stories with the world.
➡️ Join us and support the project here: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
Manana Aslamazyan was unfortunately struck by a car in Yerevan and died shortly after being interviewed on December 7, 2021. We include this interview to honor her and the important role she played in independent media in post-Soviet Russia, as will be clear from the interview.
📖 Watch/read the full interview here:
👉 therussiaprogram.org/manana_aslamaz…
🗂️ The Satinsky Archives Project preserves the voices of Russia’s civil society leaders, activists, and independent thinkers—people who have shaped the country’s democratic movements and resisted authoritarianism, often at great personal cost.
💡 To keep the project going and expand this important oral history collection, we’ve launched a crowdfunding campaign. Your support helps us record, translate, and share more of these critical stories with the world.
➡️ Join us and support the project here: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
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Why did Putin invade Ukraine?
While many explanations focus on Putin’s geopolitical ambitions or his authoritarianism, this talk explores a less discussed but crucial dimension: memory.
🔗 Register here: shorturl.at/yp0JN
@IERES_GWU
While many explanations focus on Putin’s geopolitical ambitions or his authoritarianism, this talk explores a less discussed but crucial dimension: memory.
🔗 Register here: shorturl.at/yp0JN
@IERES_GWU
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🇺🇸🇷🇺 When Trust Was Personal: Voloshin, Rice, and the Unfinished Story of U.S.–Russia Relations
What happens when personal trust collides with political mistrust?
That’s one of the central questions raised in the Applied Oral History Project by The Russia Program — a unique w, behind-the-scenes perspectives from key players in U.S.–Russia relations.
In a compelling conversation with Ivan Grek, Director of The Russia Program, Alexander Voloshin — former Chief of Staff to both Yeltsin and Putin — reflects on his own experience navigating diplomacy at the highest level.
Despite the growing tensions between Washington and Moscow, Voloshin recalls a strong personal rapport with then–National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Their relationship was marked by mutual respect, real dialogue, and — yes — trust.
But Voloshin is clear: personal ties can only go so far when broader political moves, like the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, send a different message. When actions speak louder than relationships, trust at the institutional level breaks down fast.
His story is just one of many that bring depth and nuance to an often oversimplified relationship. The Russia Program’s oral history archive aims to capture exactly that — the human side of geopolitics, and the lessons it holds for the future.
🎧 Dive into the full interview and more stories at therussiaprogram.org/oralhistory
What happens when personal trust collides with political mistrust?
That’s one of the central questions raised in the Applied Oral History Project by The Russia Program — a unique w, behind-the-scenes perspectives from key players in U.S.–Russia relations.
In a compelling conversation with Ivan Grek, Director of The Russia Program, Alexander Voloshin — former Chief of Staff to both Yeltsin and Putin — reflects on his own experience navigating diplomacy at the highest level.
Despite the growing tensions between Washington and Moscow, Voloshin recalls a strong personal rapport with then–National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Their relationship was marked by mutual respect, real dialogue, and — yes — trust.
But Voloshin is clear: personal ties can only go so far when broader political moves, like the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, send a different message. When actions speak louder than relationships, trust at the institutional level breaks down fast.
His story is just one of many that bring depth and nuance to an often oversimplified relationship. The Russia Program’s oral history archive aims to capture exactly that — the human side of geopolitics, and the lessons it holds for the future.
🎧 Dive into the full interview and more stories at therussiaprogram.org/oralhistory
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860,000 people left Russia in 2022, according to new research using big data from Facebook.
Scientists from Meta, HKU, and Harvard analyzed anonymized activity of 3 billion users to estimate global migration flows, correcting for local platform reach and demographics.
Russia net population losses — only behind Ukraine, India, and Pakistan. Most Russians moved to Europe, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and Israel
Scientists from Meta, HKU, and Harvard analyzed anonymized activity of 3 billion users to estimate global migration flows, correcting for local platform reach and demographics.
Russia net population losses — only behind Ukraine, India, and Pakistan. Most Russians moved to Europe, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and Israel
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🚨 How Putin Trains His Power Players 🇷🇺
A deep dive into Russia’s modern-day cadre policy reveals how Putin has masterfully blended Soviet legacy with Western-style management to build an elite that keeps the regime running like a well-oiled machine.
👉 therussiaprogram.org/cadre_policy_i…
he Article:
🧱 Old School Meets New School
Putin’s strategy revives the Soviet belief that “cadres decide everything”—but updates it with slick managerial methods borrowed from the West.
🏫 RANEPA: The Regime’s Ivy League
The Presidential Academy isn’t just a school—it’s a loyalty factory. It grooms future bureaucrats with both administrative skills and ideological alignment.
📊 Business Vibes in Bureaucracy
The state now talks KPIs and efficiency. Thanks to New Public Management ideas, civil servants are trained like corporate execs.
📦 Cadre Reserve = Elite on Standby
A ready-to-go talent pool ensures regime stability. It’s like having a political bench always prepped and loyal.
🌍 Soft Power in a Suit
RANEPA also operates internationally—building influence through partnerships and educational outreach. Bureaucrats with passports and propaganda.
🤝 One System, One Mindset
Standardized training builds a unified culture among elites. The result? A tightly knit, resilient power structure.
💡 Bottom line: Putin’s cadre policy isn’t just about hiring bureaucrats—it’s about crafting loyal operators who can execute the regime’s vision with precision and polish.
🔗 Read the full article here: therussiaprogram.org/cadre_policy_i…
A deep dive into Russia’s modern-day cadre policy reveals how Putin has masterfully blended Soviet legacy with Western-style management to build an elite that keeps the regime running like a well-oiled machine.
👉 therussiaprogram.org/cadre_policy_i…
he Article:
🧱 Old School Meets New School
Putin’s strategy revives the Soviet belief that “cadres decide everything”—but updates it with slick managerial methods borrowed from the West.
🏫 RANEPA: The Regime’s Ivy League
The Presidential Academy isn’t just a school—it’s a loyalty factory. It grooms future bureaucrats with both administrative skills and ideological alignment.
📊 Business Vibes in Bureaucracy
The state now talks KPIs and efficiency. Thanks to New Public Management ideas, civil servants are trained like corporate execs.
📦 Cadre Reserve = Elite on Standby
A ready-to-go talent pool ensures regime stability. It’s like having a political bench always prepped and loyal.
🌍 Soft Power in a Suit
RANEPA also operates internationally—building influence through partnerships and educational outreach. Bureaucrats with passports and propaganda.
🤝 One System, One Mindset
Standardized training builds a unified culture among elites. The result? A tightly knit, resilient power structure.
💡 Bottom line: Putin’s cadre policy isn’t just about hiring bureaucrats—it’s about crafting loyal operators who can execute the regime’s vision with precision and polish.
🔗 Read the full article here: therussiaprogram.org/cadre_policy_i…
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🚨 We start at 11:15 (UTC -4)
Join the Russia Program Conference 2025 live on Zoom! 📷 Click to join:
c-span.org/schedule/?chan…
Tune in for expert insights and real-time discussions on Russia and the post-Soviet region. Don’t miss out — the conversation is already underway!
Join the Russia Program Conference 2025 live on Zoom! 📷 Click to join:
c-span.org/schedule/?chan…
Tune in for expert insights and real-time discussions on Russia and the post-Soviet region. Don’t miss out — the conversation is already underway!
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🎙️ “I want Udmurt literature to become part of popular culture.”
therussiaprogram.org/udmurt_literat…
Anastasia Shumilova—writer, editor, and curator of the Telegram channel "What Does the Votyachka Sing About?"—is on a mission: to bring Udmurt voices out of the shadows and into the this powerful interview with anthropologist Dmitry Oparin via The Russia Program, Shumilova talks about the deep roots of Udmurt literary tradition and the urgent need to break free from the outdated, one-dimensional view of indigenous cultures as only folklore.
💬 “We’re more than songs, embroidery, and costumes,” she says. “Udmurt literature is alive, emotional, and contemporary—and it deserves to be seen.”
But it’s not just about visibility. It’s about reclaiming a cultural voice that was nearly silenced during the Soviet era, when repression, censorship, and industrialization policies shaped and often stifled indigenous expression. Shumilova is now helping lead a revival—one rooted in modern storytelling, digital platforms, and fearless identity.
Whether through poetry, podcasts, or Telegram threads, she’s carving out space for Udmurt literature in the now.
📖 Dive into this inspiring conversation here: therussiaprogram.org/udmurt_literat…
therussiaprogram.org/udmurt_literat…
Anastasia Shumilova—writer, editor, and curator of the Telegram channel "What Does the Votyachka Sing About?"—is on a mission: to bring Udmurt voices out of the shadows and into the this powerful interview with anthropologist Dmitry Oparin via The Russia Program, Shumilova talks about the deep roots of Udmurt literary tradition and the urgent need to break free from the outdated, one-dimensional view of indigenous cultures as only folklore.
💬 “We’re more than songs, embroidery, and costumes,” she says. “Udmurt literature is alive, emotional, and contemporary—and it deserves to be seen.”
But it’s not just about visibility. It’s about reclaiming a cultural voice that was nearly silenced during the Soviet era, when repression, censorship, and industrialization policies shaped and often stifled indigenous expression. Shumilova is now helping lead a revival—one rooted in modern storytelling, digital platforms, and fearless identity.
Whether through poetry, podcasts, or Telegram threads, she’s carving out space for Udmurt literature in the now.
📖 Dive into this inspiring conversation here: therussiaprogram.org/udmurt_literat…
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🌍 Join Us Online for the 2025 Russia Program Conference! 🎥
We’re excited to announce that the upcoming Russia Program Conference 2025 will be broadcasted online this year — so you can attend from anywhere in the world.
🗓 Date: April 18, 2025
🔗 Register now: shorturl.at/7rKAm
This event brings together top experts, scholars, and practitioners to explore critical developments in Russia and the broader post-Soviet space. Expect thought-provoking panels, timely discussions, and fresh insights on politics, security, society, and more.
Whether you're a researcher, policymaker, student, or just deeply curious about the region — this is a conversation you won’t want to miss.
👉 More details about the conference here: therussiaprogram.org/conference_2025
✅ Free and open to the public. Pre-registration required.
We’re excited to announce that the upcoming Russia Program Conference 2025 will be broadcasted online this year — so you can attend from anywhere in the world.
🗓 Date: April 18, 2025
🔗 Register now: shorturl.at/7rKAm
This event brings together top experts, scholars, and practitioners to explore critical developments in Russia and the broader post-Soviet space. Expect thought-provoking panels, timely discussions, and fresh insights on politics, security, society, and more.
Whether you're a researcher, policymaker, student, or just deeply curious about the region — this is a conversation you won’t want to miss.
👉 More details about the conference here: therussiaprogram.org/conference_2025
✅ Free and open to the public. Pre-registration required.
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🪖 Is Russia’s War in Ukraine Nearing Its End?
A recent deep-dive from The Russia Program reveals how Russians really feel as the conflict enters its third year. Here are the highlights:
🔹 51% of Russians believe the war will end within a year
🔹 Optimism is strongest among Trump & Xi are seen as possible keys to peace
🔹 Younger Russians (18–30) are the most hopeful
🔹 Women are more likely to expect a quick end
🔹 High earners expect it to last longer
🔹 VPN & YouTube users are better informed and more confident in their answers
🔹 Those who’ve benefited from the war? More optimistic.
🔹 Support for peace talks has hit its highest point since 2022—📈
Read the full article 👉 therussiaprogram.org/special_milita…
A recent deep-dive from The Russia Program reveals how Russians really feel as the conflict enters its third year. Here are the highlights:
🔹 51% of Russians believe the war will end within a year
🔹 Optimism is strongest among Trump & Xi are seen as possible keys to peace
🔹 Younger Russians (18–30) are the most hopeful
🔹 Women are more likely to expect a quick end
🔹 High earners expect it to last longer
🔹 VPN & YouTube users are better informed and more confident in their answers
🔹 Those who’ve benefited from the war? More optimistic.
🔹 Support for peace talks has hit its highest point since 2022—📈
Read the full article 👉 therussiaprogram.org/special_milita…
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When Sergei Magnitsky died in a Russian prison in 2009 after uncovering massive government fraud, it sparked global outrage. But behind the scenes, it also reshaped U.S.-Russia relations in ways few expected.
In a an interview to the #satinskyarchives, Randi Levinas, former .–Russia Business Council, shared how the Magnitsky Act — passed in 2012 — wasn't just about justice for Magnitsky. It was also a political balancing act. At the time, Congress was preparing to lift the outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment, opening trade with Russia. To do that without appearing soft on human rights, lawmakers pushed through the Magnitsky Act, which sanctioned Russian officials linked to abuse and corruption.
Levinas explained that while U.S. businesses stayed focused on market access and trade, the Magnitsky Act marked a turning point — where human rights and foreign policy collided with economic interests. It was the start of a new era where sanctions became a key tool in global diplomacy.
👉 Watch the full interview here: therussiaprogram.org/randi_levinas
👉 Help us bring more voices from the Archive to light — join our crowdfunding campaign today to support this important work: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
In a an interview to the #satinskyarchives, Randi Levinas, former .–Russia Business Council, shared how the Magnitsky Act — passed in 2012 — wasn't just about justice for Magnitsky. It was also a political balancing act. At the time, Congress was preparing to lift the outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment, opening trade with Russia. To do that without appearing soft on human rights, lawmakers pushed through the Magnitsky Act, which sanctioned Russian officials linked to abuse and corruption.
Levinas explained that while U.S. businesses stayed focused on market access and trade, the Magnitsky Act marked a turning point — where human rights and foreign policy collided with economic interests. It was the start of a new era where sanctions became a key tool in global diplomacy.
👉 Watch the full interview here: therussiaprogram.org/randi_levinas
👉 Help us bring more voices from the Archive to light — join our crowdfunding campaign today to support this important work: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
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The U.S. sanctions policy toward Russia is a key tool for addressing behavior seen as contrary to international norms. Randi Levinas, former Executive VP of the U.S.-Russia Business Council, offers a nuanced perspective on these measures. She describes sanctions as often overly itical emotion, which can limit flexibility and lead to unintended consequences.
Levinas advocates for targeted, conduct-based sanctions that consider their economic impact on U.S. companies. Through her leadership roles at USRBC and the Coalition for U.S.-Russia Trade, she worked to mitigate negative effects on American businesses, engaging policymakers to refine sanctions and support U.S. economic interests while upholding national security goals.
Watch an excerpt from her interview for #satinskyarchives project.
👉 The full interview is available here: therussiaprogram.org/randi_levinas
👉 Help us bring more voices from the Archive to light — join our crowdfunding campaign today to support this important work: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
Levinas advocates for targeted, conduct-based sanctions that consider their economic impact on U.S. companies. Through her leadership roles at USRBC and the Coalition for U.S.-Russia Trade, she worked to mitigate negative effects on American businesses, engaging policymakers to refine sanctions and support U.S. economic interests while upholding national security goals.
Watch an excerpt from her interview for #satinskyarchives project.
👉 The full interview is available here: therussiaprogram.org/randi_levinas
👉 Help us bring more voices from the Archive to light — join our crowdfunding campaign today to support this important work: gofundme.com/f/save-the-ora…
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