Pinned Tweet
Happy Eid ❤️
There will come a day when we celebrate Eid in our homeland of East Turkistan for which we all fight and pray!
Live recording from a casual Uyghur dance performance at the Kurultaj 2018, Bugac, Hungary. @UyghurProject @lukedepulford @UyghurCongress @benedictrogers
There will come a day when we celebrate Eid in our homeland of East Turkistan for which we all fight and pray!
Live recording from a casual Uyghur dance performance at the Kurultaj 2018, Bugac, Hungary. @UyghurProject @lukedepulford @UyghurCongress @benedictrogers
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
If you can cheat, then cheat 能骗就骗 is a well known saying and philosophy in mainland China, unfortunately the bad eggs who practice this way of life have moved all around the globe and practice it to its fullest. This time in Tokyo where a Chinese national has just been caught disrupting cellular networks to scam the public. If you can cheat… then cheat
日本首例伪基站电诈，抓获一名中国人！
11月7日，东京警视厅在银座逮捕中国籍男子于海（31岁）。这是日本首例因干扰手机通信查办伪基站的案件。
他在车内用类似IMSI Catcher的设备发射强干扰电波，让周围约500米内手机（单次可达上万台）显示“无服务”1-2小时。
短信（称信用卡可能被盗刷，引导点击输入卡号）。
警方确认，自2024年底起他多次在银座、新宿、涩谷作案，至少18名中国游客/留学生报案受害，损失约400万日元。嫌疑人目前全程否认。
这不是普通群发诈骗，而是主动制造断网再精准投递。在人流密集的银座，既提高诈骗效率，也可能影响紧急呼叫。
日本《电波法》对此有处罚，但过去对这类移动通信层面的主动攻击准备不足。
如果你近期在东京收到中文“信用卡异常”短信，且信号突然变差的，建议直接联系银行核实，不要点链接，很可能是你的老乡在东京街头骗你。
案件仍在调查是否有组织背景。作为日本首例，它已经把中国国内常见的伪基站问题，带到了日本街头。
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
La espía china no solo quería los secretos de Nvidia, sino también a su CEO Jensen Huang.
Estuve leyendo la historia completa y es de película: la inteligencia de Estados Unidos concluyó que una ejecutiva china, Alice Huang, fue reclutada por el Ministerio de Seguridad del l CEO de Nvidia, el hombre que dirige la empresa más valiosa del mundo en plena guerra de los chips.
Alice Huang no es pariente de Jensen Huang, aunque compartan apellido. Era directora gerente de Megaspeed International, una empresa de centros de datos de Singapur, cliente de Nvidia y socia de su red de nube. Se conocieron por negocios: hay fotos juntos en un bar de Taipéi en junio de 2024, y los vieron de nuevo tras una cena en mayo de 2025.
Según el New York Times, la vigilancia electrónica sobre Alice reveló su contacto con un estadounidense, y al identificarlo resultó ser Jensen Huang. La conclusión de inteligencia: ella pasaba información a Pekín, y su misión incluía recabar datos sobre los chips de IA más avanzados de Nvidia y tratar de que Huang presionara para que se enviaran GPU avanzadas a China.
En paralelo corre la otra trama: Megaspeed ya estaba bajo investigación del Departamento de Comercio desde finales de 2024, cuando un funcionario encontró equipos de Nvidia todavía en cajas en un centro de datos en Malasia. Su filial malasia compró al menos 4.800 millones de dólares en equipos con chips Nvidia entre junio de 2024 y febrero de 2026. El caso pasó al Departamento de Justicia en 2026. Nvidia dice que investigó y no encontró desvío. Comprar mucho no prueba por sí solo que los chips terminaran en China.
El estallido llegó el 29 de octubre, cuando el Times publicó la historia. China lo negó todo. Singapur aclaró que nunca investigó a Alice Huang como espía (la investigación sobre Megaspeed como empresa sí sigue abierta). Tres presidentes de comités de la Cámara pidieron una sesión a puerta cerrada para el 18 de noviembre.
Y el domingo 8 de noviembre llegó la confirmación personal: Jensen Huang escribió a los empleados admitiendo que fue infiel a su esposa, sin nombrar a nadie. El consejo de Nvidia abrió una investigación independiente y dice no tener motivos para creer que se comprometieran secretos o la seguridad nacional. Trump lo llamó una persona honorable. Las acciones cayeron alrededor de 3% fuera de horario.
Aquí hay que separar dos cosas. La infidelidad la confirmó el propio Huang. El espionaje, no: es una evaluación de inteligencia basada en fuentes anónimas y un memorando clasificado que nadie ha visto. No hay cargos contra nadie, no hay detenciones, y no se ha hecho público qué información pasó Alice Huang, si es que pasó alguna.
Lo que sí queda claro es el cambio de época: la guerra por los chips ya no se libra solo con aranceles y controles de exportación. Ahora el objetivo es la persona. El CEO de la empresa más valiosa del planeta era el blanco, y ni siquiera lo sabía.
Estuve leyendo la historia completa y es de película: la inteligencia de Estados Unidos concluyó que una ejecutiva china, Alice Huang, fue reclutada por el Ministerio de Seguridad del l CEO de Nvidia, el hombre que dirige la empresa más valiosa del mundo en plena guerra de los chips.
Alice Huang no es pariente de Jensen Huang, aunque compartan apellido. Era directora gerente de Megaspeed International, una empresa de centros de datos de Singapur, cliente de Nvidia y socia de su red de nube. Se conocieron por negocios: hay fotos juntos en un bar de Taipéi en junio de 2024, y los vieron de nuevo tras una cena en mayo de 2025.
Según el New York Times, la vigilancia electrónica sobre Alice reveló su contacto con un estadounidense, y al identificarlo resultó ser Jensen Huang. La conclusión de inteligencia: ella pasaba información a Pekín, y su misión incluía recabar datos sobre los chips de IA más avanzados de Nvidia y tratar de que Huang presionara para que se enviaran GPU avanzadas a China.
En paralelo corre la otra trama: Megaspeed ya estaba bajo investigación del Departamento de Comercio desde finales de 2024, cuando un funcionario encontró equipos de Nvidia todavía en cajas en un centro de datos en Malasia. Su filial malasia compró al menos 4.800 millones de dólares en equipos con chips Nvidia entre junio de 2024 y febrero de 2026. El caso pasó al Departamento de Justicia en 2026. Nvidia dice que investigó y no encontró desvío. Comprar mucho no prueba por sí solo que los chips terminaran en China.
El estallido llegó el 29 de octubre, cuando el Times publicó la historia. China lo negó todo. Singapur aclaró que nunca investigó a Alice Huang como espía (la investigación sobre Megaspeed como empresa sí sigue abierta). Tres presidentes de comités de la Cámara pidieron una sesión a puerta cerrada para el 18 de noviembre.
Y el domingo 8 de noviembre llegó la confirmación personal: Jensen Huang escribió a los empleados admitiendo que fue infiel a su esposa, sin nombrar a nadie. El consejo de Nvidia abrió una investigación independiente y dice no tener motivos para creer que se comprometieran secretos o la seguridad nacional. Trump lo llamó una persona honorable. Las acciones cayeron alrededor de 3% fuera de horario.
Aquí hay que separar dos cosas. La infidelidad la confirmó el propio Huang. El espionaje, no: es una evaluación de inteligencia basada en fuentes anónimas y un memorando clasificado que nadie ha visto. No hay cargos contra nadie, no hay detenciones, y no se ha hecho público qué información pasó Alice Huang, si es que pasó alguna.
Lo que sí queda claro es el cambio de época: la guerra por los chips ya no se libra solo con aranceles y controles de exportación. Ahora el objetivo es la persona. El CEO de la empresa más valiosa del planeta era el blanco, y ni siquiera lo sabía.
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Jensen Huang should step side as Nvidia CEO while the company’s investigation continues. The investigation, if it exonerates him, will appear tainted if he does not take a leave.
BREAKING: Alleged Chinese spy Alice Huang reportedly “boasted” of access to Nvidia GPUs & connections to Alibaba while pitching AI chip deals to investors. — FT
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Huang’s honey trap is a warning: China’s MSS will stop at nothing in gaining business and military supremacy.
Who is next?
telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/11/1…
Who is next?
telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/11/1…
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
I’m sorry WHAT?
A company run by a Chinese spy funded private intelligence efforts to develop kompromat on MPs and Peers sanctioned by China?
And they’re finding out via the Daily Mail?
dailymail.com/news/article-1…
A company run by a Chinese spy funded private intelligence efforts to develop kompromat on MPs and Peers sanctioned by China?
And they’re finding out via the Daily Mail?
dailymail.com/news/article-1…
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Rahile Omer, the youngest person identified in the leaked 2022 Xinjiang Police Files, has died in prison aged just 23. Chinese authorities detained her when she was only 14.
In her memory, we ask you toscreenshot her portrait and change your profile picture.
@MahmutRahima
In her memory, we ask you toscreenshot her portrait and change your profile picture.
@MahmutRahima
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
In China, people almost all the time fear the regime and obey. Sometimes, however, they explode. Anger builds up in repressive societies.
China's economic troubles are spilling onto the streets. From construction sites to factory floors, workers are gathering to demand their overdue wages.
Watch till the end.
#ChinaEconomicTroubles
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The power of music transcends borders and gives voice to stories that must be heard.
Through our musical collaboration with Professor Erdem Özdemir and his extraordinary band, we tell the stories of my Uyghur people.
Join us tonight at 22:45 (Türkiye time) on TRT Müzik!❤️💐🎉
Through our musical collaboration with Professor Erdem Özdemir and his extraordinary band, we tell the stories of my Uyghur people.
Join us tonight at 22:45 (Türkiye time) on TRT Müzik!❤️💐🎉
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Joshua Wong has been robbed of his youth by an insecure regime, forcing him to serve time twice for the same “offences”.
Meanwhile the UK, who, with China promised to uphold Hong Kong’s autonomy, will allow Joshua to pay the price for their failure. “Very concerned”.
Meanwhile the UK, who, with China promised to uphold Hong Kong’s autonomy, will allow Joshua to pay the price for their failure. “Very concerned”.
Activist Joshua Wong, 30, who became the international face of Hong Kong's democracy movement, was sentenced to 10 years in jail on a charge of collusion with foreign entities under the city's national security law reut.rs/4815nHH
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
🚨 BREAKING: The UK Government has committed to legislating against forced labour in supply chains, including removing forced-labour goods from GB markets.
A welcome step, but the £350m threshold risks leaving loopholes for smaller businesses.
@MahmutRahima
A welcome step, but the £350m threshold risks leaving loopholes for smaller businesses.
@MahmutRahima
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Where is UN rights chief @volker_turk on this case? Or does his policy of never criticizing Beijing for their treatment of Uyghurs mean he'll ignore the fate of these two men too?
Today, SLP's @RayhanAsat sent an urgent appeal to the UN concerning the fate of two Uyghur men detained in Thailand who face deportation to China.
The SLP strongly requested that Mandate Holders issue an expedited statement demanding that Thailand halt plans for extradition.
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
UK Parliament's 1st report on doing business with #China concludes that govt has failed to deliver on its 2024 promise of a new, strategic, long-term, consistent UK approach to China committees.parliament.uk/committee/365/… 1/2
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Mission affichage en cours ✅
Merci à tous nos bénévoles qui sont venus nous donner un coup de pouce!
@BlocQuebecois @forumjeunessebq
#lauriersaintemarie #electionpartielle
Merci à tous nos bénévoles qui sont venus nous donner un coup de pouce!
@BlocQuebecois @forumjeunessebq
#lauriersaintemarie #electionpartielle
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
Thailand has kept Uyghurs in inhumane detention for years and then complied with Beijing’s demands to send them to China, where they were forcibly disappeared. Now, two Uyghurs are at imminent risk. Thai authorities should halt returning them to harm’s way.hrw.org/news/2026/11/0…
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
As Cyber Bill Amendment 164 goes to @HouseofCommons for ping pong, I urge Ministers to read @liambyrnemp Report.
What I said in @UKHouseofLords: “So why do I support Amendment 164? (With @TimClementJone1 @NickMarkham @JonathanCamrose )?Part 4 of the Bill rightly equips the formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the Bill stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we are to empower Ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. Amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems—something that came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked. We do not necessarily know by whom, but we can no doubt guess.
We certainly know that in the past the NHS was subjected to attacks by the regime in North Korea. Critically, this is not a political blacklist. It is not subject to diplomatic whim; it is an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard, objective assessments of GCHQ. Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies have perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, that state must be listed.The definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be wilful blindness.This amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all.
Furthermore, Amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive Administrations,our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the Government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before @UKParliament within 6 months,this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift.
Let me end by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of @HumanRightsCtte into transnational repression. Our domestic policy’s failure is illustrated by the reluctance to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously to place China,the state we found was the most responsible for transnational repression in the UK, even more than Russia or Iran, in the foreign influence registration scheme’s top tier. Unlike with those two other countries,we have failed to do so.
When @eliz_lloyd comes to reply can she give us any information about whether @DanJarvisMBE , -responsible for security issues-who promised to continue to keep this issue under review,has done anything further to act on our committee’s recommendations & those raised by the Intelligence & Security Committee,led by Lord Beamish (see reply below).
Strategic ambiguity has been the order of the day. It does not deter authoritarian regimes; merely invites opportunistic aggression. If we are serious about building genuine national cyber resilience,replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical,transparent and accountable framework.I urge @_Government_UK to embrace this vital measure & accept Amendment 164 Short summary here:
httpswww.davidalton.net/2026/11/01/two… @andyburnham @KemiBadenoch @EdwardJDavey @TomTugendhat @ShabanaMahmood
What I said in @UKHouseofLords: “So why do I support Amendment 164? (With @TimClementJone1 @NickMarkham @JonathanCamrose )?Part 4 of the Bill rightly equips the formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the Bill stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we are to empower Ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. Amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems—something that came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked. We do not necessarily know by whom, but we can no doubt guess.
We certainly know that in the past the NHS was subjected to attacks by the regime in North Korea. Critically, this is not a political blacklist. It is not subject to diplomatic whim; it is an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard, objective assessments of GCHQ. Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies have perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, that state must be listed.The definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be wilful blindness.This amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all.
Furthermore, Amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive Administrations,our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the Government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before @UKParliament within 6 months,this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift.
Let me end by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of @HumanRightsCtte into transnational repression. Our domestic policy’s failure is illustrated by the reluctance to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously to place China,the state we found was the most responsible for transnational repression in the UK, even more than Russia or Iran, in the foreign influence registration scheme’s top tier. Unlike with those two other countries,we have failed to do so.
When @eliz_lloyd comes to reply can she give us any information about whether @DanJarvisMBE , -responsible for security issues-who promised to continue to keep this issue under review,has done anything further to act on our committee’s recommendations & those raised by the Intelligence & Security Committee,led by Lord Beamish (see reply below).
Strategic ambiguity has been the order of the day. It does not deter authoritarian regimes; merely invites opportunistic aggression. If we are serious about building genuine national cyber resilience,replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical,transparent and accountable framework.I urge @_Government_UK to embrace this vital measure & accept Amendment 164 Short summary here:
httpswww.davidalton.net/2026/11/01/two… @andyburnham @KemiBadenoch @EdwardJDavey @TomTugendhat @ShabanaMahmood
Government have had repeated warnings about their foolish policy of making the UK dependent on CCP dictatorship and failing to develop a strategically resilient policy - which puts national security first. Latest wake up call from @liambyrnemp Chair of @HouseofCommons Business, Trade Committee. Read report at committees.parliament.uk/committee/365/… Also See liambyrne.substack.com/p/britain-need… And Reports T’graph & Mail
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
CCP Persecution: Check out some of the people persecuted in China for their faith @HRWFint produce regular reports and say that a “ huge number of believers of all faiths are arrested and imprisoned for years: thousands of Falun Gong practitioners and Church of Almighty God members + 1-2 million Uyghur Muslims reeducated in camps.
A Database of Uyghur Muslim Prisoners is run by shahit.biz/eng/ and contains over 61,000 documented cases.
A Database of Political Prisoners is also run by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database with Archives stopping in October 2019.
HRWF also has archives off-line.
The number of documented cases below is merely illustrative and is just the tip of the iceberg.
CHINA: Christians (Catholics – Protestants) – 62
CHINA: Buddhists (Tibetans) – 94
CHINA: Muslims – 193
CHINA: Falun Gong – 194
CHINA: Church of Almighty God – 264
CHINA: Unspecified Believers – 11 .Read in full - See CHINA: Religious persecution and issues – Bimonthly Digest October 16-31 | Human Rights Without Frontiers url.uk.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/EvECCZY7Jt77… And hrwf.eu/china-religiou…
A Database of Uyghur Muslim Prisoners is run by shahit.biz/eng/ and contains over 61,000 documented cases.
A Database of Political Prisoners is also run by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database with Archives stopping in October 2019.
HRWF also has archives off-line.
The number of documented cases below is merely illustrative and is just the tip of the iceberg.
CHINA: Christians (Catholics – Protestants) – 62
CHINA: Buddhists (Tibetans) – 94
CHINA: Muslims – 193
CHINA: Falun Gong – 194
CHINA: Church of Almighty God – 264
CHINA: Unspecified Believers – 11 .Read in full - See CHINA: Religious persecution and issues – Bimonthly Digest October 16-31 | Human Rights Without Frontiers url.uk.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/EvECCZY7Jt77… And hrwf.eu/china-religiou…
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
This Islamophobia Awareness Month, we stand in solidarity with all those facing religious discrimination and persecution.
Stay tuned to SUG’s social media channels and website throughout the month as we highlight the importance of this month of solidarity.
@MahmutRahima
Stay tuned to SUG’s social media channels and website throughout the month as we highlight the importance of this month of solidarity.
@MahmutRahima
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
两名中国公民受中国情报机构指使，拍摄了美国海军征兵站和导弹核潜艇基地。两人各被判处30个月监禁。
10月30日，奥克兰的一名联邦法官对40岁的赖利仁（Liren “Ryan” Lai，音译）和39岁的陈远策（Yuance Chen，音译）作出判决，认定他们充当了中国国家安全部（MSS）未注册的代理人。赖利仁居住在中国，持访问签证进入美国；陈远策则是居住在俄勒冈州“快乐谷”（Happy Valley）的美国绿卡持有者。两人均已认罪。刑满释放后，他们还将面临三年的监管期。
法庭文件显示，赖利仁最迟于2021年5月将陈远策招募至麾下。此后，陈远策拍摄了位于华盛顿州的基察普海军基地（Navy Base Kitsap）——这是美国弹道导弹核潜艇的重要基地。他还拍摄并录制了南加州一处海军征兵站内的新兵和水兵，其中包括一块列有新兵姓名及家乡的公告板；据报道，名单上的许多人与中国有关联。
陈远策还保存了所谓的“目标档案包”（targeting packages）——即针对被视为潜在招募对象的军事人员所整理的详细个人资料，其中包含了一名海军雇员的个人信息。调查人员在其位于俄勒冈州的家中发现了这些资料。
其所采用的手段十分典型。2022年1月，有人将一个装有约1万美元现金的背包放置在加利福尼亚州利弗莫尔（Livermore）的一处日租储物柜中，作为“死信投递”（即秘密交接点）。2023年3月，赖利仁交给陈远策一部用于与中国国家安全部进行秘密联络的手机；陈远策称该手机涉及“国家机密”。2025年，赖利仁再次乘机抵达美国，协助完成了另一笔约2万美元的现金支付。
2025年6月27日，在美国联邦调查局（FBI）的一次联合行动中，两人被捕。该罪名最高可判处10年监禁，最终两人各被判处30个月监禁。
美国助理司法部长形容此举为一项“规模庞大且肆无忌惮”的行动，旨在支持中国的情报工作，并在美国境内进行招募活动。
他们针对的目标并非机密文件，而是年轻的水兵，以及那些未来某天可能被说服去泄露机密的人。
10月30日，奥克兰的一名联邦法官对40岁的赖利仁（Liren “Ryan” Lai，音译）和39岁的陈远策（Yuance Chen，音译）作出判决，认定他们充当了中国国家安全部（MSS）未注册的代理人。赖利仁居住在中国，持访问签证进入美国；陈远策则是居住在俄勒冈州“快乐谷”（Happy Valley）的美国绿卡持有者。两人均已认罪。刑满释放后，他们还将面临三年的监管期。
法庭文件显示，赖利仁最迟于2021年5月将陈远策招募至麾下。此后，陈远策拍摄了位于华盛顿州的基察普海军基地（Navy Base Kitsap）——这是美国弹道导弹核潜艇的重要基地。他还拍摄并录制了南加州一处海军征兵站内的新兵和水兵，其中包括一块列有新兵姓名及家乡的公告板；据报道，名单上的许多人与中国有关联。
陈远策还保存了所谓的“目标档案包”（targeting packages）——即针对被视为潜在招募对象的军事人员所整理的详细个人资料，其中包含了一名海军雇员的个人信息。调查人员在其位于俄勒冈州的家中发现了这些资料。
其所采用的手段十分典型。2022年1月，有人将一个装有约1万美元现金的背包放置在加利福尼亚州利弗莫尔（Livermore）的一处日租储物柜中，作为“死信投递”（即秘密交接点）。2023年3月，赖利仁交给陈远策一部用于与中国国家安全部进行秘密联络的手机；陈远策称该手机涉及“国家机密”。2025年，赖利仁再次乘机抵达美国，协助完成了另一笔约2万美元的现金支付。
2025年6月27日，在美国联邦调查局（FBI）的一次联合行动中，两人被捕。该罪名最高可判处10年监禁，最终两人各被判处30个月监禁。
美国助理司法部长形容此举为一项“规模庞大且肆无忌惮”的行动，旨在支持中国的情报工作，并在美国境内进行招募活动。
他们针对的目标并非机密文件，而是年轻的水兵，以及那些未来某天可能被说服去泄露机密的人。
Two Chinese nationals photographed a Navy recruiting station and a missile-submarine base for China’s spy agency. Each got 30 months.
On October 30, a federal judge in Oakland sentenced Liren “Ryan” Lai, 40, and Yuance Chen, 39, for acting as unregistered agents of China’s ity. Lai lived in China and traveled to the US on a visitor visa. Chen was a US green-card holder in Happy Valley, Oregon. Both pleaded guilty. They face three years of supervised release after prison.
Court documents say Lai recruited Chen no later than May 2021. Chen then photographed Navy Base Kitsap in Washington, a major base for ballistic missile submarines. He also photographed and filmed recruits and sailors inside a Navy recruiting station in Southern California, including a bulletin board listing recruits’ names and hometowns, many reportedly linked to China.
Chen kept “targeting packages,” detailed biographical files on military personnel seen as possible recruitment targets, including personal information on a Navy employee. Investigators found them at his Oregon home.
The tradecraft was classic. In January 2022, a backpack with about $10,000 in cash was left in a day-use locker in Livermore, California, as a dead drop. In March 2023, Lai delivered a phone for covert communication with the MSS to Chen, who called it a “state secret.” In 2025, Lai flew in again to help with another cash payment of about $20,000.
They were arrested on June 27, 2025, in a coordinated FBI operation. The maximum was 10 years, and each got 30 months.
The assistant attorney general called it an “extensive and brazen” effort to support Chinese intelligence and recruit in the United States.
The target wasn’t a secret document. It was young sailors, and the people who might one day be persuaded to hand them over.
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Rahima Mahmut retweeted
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