A remarkable and heated exchange on Nuce TV, a pro-PKK Kurdish channel, between Riham Hassan, a representative of the pro-PKK Yazidi women’s movement in Sinjar, and Remezan Kerim, a Kurdish nationalist from Erbil.
Hassan insists that Yazidis are a distinct ethnic group, separate ts this, repeatedly calls her Kurdish and accuses her of national treason.
Most notably, Kerim invokes the epic of Dewresh Evdi, a legendary Yazidi warrior who, in one documented version of the oral tradition, declares:
"I am neither Kiki nor Milan. I have been Yazidi for seventy generations."
Kerim then renders the line as: "I am Yazidi and I am Kurd."
Academic research firmly establishes Dewresh's Yazidi identity but does not record Kerim's formulation as a direct quotation from Evdi.
However, the epic survives in many oral variations, some of which explicitly place Yazidis within a broader Kurdish identity. A 2022 academic study comparing six versions found that those preserved by Yazidi communities often emphasise both a distinct religious identity and a shared Kurdish identity, while versions among Muslim Kurdish communities focus more on tribal relationships.
The epic is therefore more complicated than either side suggests. Dewresh's Yazidi identity is well established, and his association with Kurdishness also has a basis in the wider tradition.
The exchange is particularly revealing because Hassan herself belongs to the PKK-aligned network and embraces the ideology of jailed PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, while asserting a distinct Yazidi ethnic identity.
This may reflect a strand of Ocalan's thought that emphasises plural identities and the right of communities to define themselves, leaving room for Yazidis to identify as a distinct people rather than necessarily as Kurds. Kerim represents the more conventional Kurdish nationalist position, which regards Yazidis as an integral part of the Kurdish nation regardless of how individuals identify.
The confrontation exposes a basic difference in how the two approach identity: Hassan insists on the right to define her own, while Kerim insists on defining it for her. Even a shared epic becomes a vehicle for competing claims.
Hassan insists that Yazidis are a distinct ethnic group, separate ts this, repeatedly calls her Kurdish and accuses her of national treason.
Most notably, Kerim invokes the epic of Dewresh Evdi, a legendary Yazidi warrior who, in one documented version of the oral tradition, declares:
"I am neither Kiki nor Milan. I have been Yazidi for seventy generations."
Kerim then renders the line as: "I am Yazidi and I am Kurd."
Academic research firmly establishes Dewresh's Yazidi identity but does not record Kerim's formulation as a direct quotation from Evdi.
However, the epic survives in many oral variations, some of which explicitly place Yazidis within a broader Kurdish identity. A 2022 academic study comparing six versions found that those preserved by Yazidi communities often emphasise both a distinct religious identity and a shared Kurdish identity, while versions among Muslim Kurdish communities focus more on tribal relationships.
The epic is therefore more complicated than either side suggests. Dewresh's Yazidi identity is well established, and his association with Kurdishness also has a basis in the wider tradition.
The exchange is particularly revealing because Hassan herself belongs to the PKK-aligned network and embraces the ideology of jailed PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, while asserting a distinct Yazidi ethnic identity.
This may reflect a strand of Ocalan's thought that emphasises plural identities and the right of communities to define themselves, leaving room for Yazidis to identify as a distinct people rather than necessarily as Kurds. Kerim represents the more conventional Kurdish nationalist position, which regards Yazidis as an integral part of the Kurdish nation regardless of how individuals identify.
The confrontation exposes a basic difference in how the two approach identity: Hassan insists on the right to define her own, while Kerim insists on defining it for her. Even a shared epic becomes a vehicle for competing claims.
A lot has been happening in Sinjar since last year, with far-reaching implications:
There is now a convergence between the pro-PKK YBŞ and the Yazidi Cause Alliance as well as other Yazidi figures, particularly among those who regard Sinjar as Iraqi and Yazidis as a distinct Yazidi militia with significant influence in pockets in Sinjar and is part of the PKK’s regional network.
This is significant because, for the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a grassroots Yazidi political movement has emerged that is outperforming the KDP, which has dominated Sinjar in post-Saddam Iraq.
The Yazidi Cause Alliance, formed by several prominent Yazidi activists ahead of the 2025 elections, was a new political project that many influential figures did not initially take seriously. Yet it managed to secure more than 50,000 votes in its first electoral test. This suggests it could perform even better in future elections, particularly as its success may attract more prominent and popular Yazidi figures.
What makes this alliance particularly important is several developments.
First, there was recently a disagreement between Murad Ismail, its MP and parliamentary faction leader, and the leadership of the alliance’s political wing. Remarkably, they managed to resolve their differences and are now working together. This is an important sign that the project may be more serious and sustainable than previous attempts, which often collapsed over internal disagreements. It may also suggest that more influential figures are backing it.
Second, and perhaps more fascinating, the Yazidi Cause Alliance has been negotiating politically on behalf of the YBŞ over its integration into Iraq’s security establishment. This includes an agreement for the YBŞ to withdraw from Mount Sinjar and hand over its positions to the Iraqi army in exchange for integrating its estimated 2,000 to 4,000 fighters into the Hashd al-Shaabi, as the Iraqi prime minister said yesterday (videoed).
This is notable because it means Yazidis are increasingly developing their own political representation, independent of Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. This could have far-reaching implications for Sinjar’s political future and the prospects of its return to the Kurdistan Region’s administration.
Third, this may be the first time in decades that Yazidi civilian figures and activists, rather than traditional tribal leaders, are at the forefront of such a political movement.
Historically, there have been prominent Yazidi movements independent of traditional Kurdish parties, but these were often led by tribal figures, given that Yazidis, much like Kurds, have a strongly tribal social structure.
This time, however, the Yazidi Cause Alliance is essentially a civilian, non-tribal political coalition. That makes it potentially more significant than previous attempts to establish an independent Yazidi political movement.
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For the first time, Iraq’s State Administration Coalition has invited not only the KDP and PUK but also the New Generation and Halwest Movements to its meeting on the KRG’s share of the 2027 Iraqi budget.
This is notable because parties outside the KDP and PUK have not d in the coalition’s budget discussions. New Generation has three seats in the Iraqi parliament and 15 in Kudistan parliament and Halwest has five seats in the Iraqi parliament and four in the Kurdistan Parliament.
According to media reports, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Finance Minister have demanded that the KRG hand over 445,000 barrels of oil per day and adopt the ASYCUDA customs system as part of the 2027 budget deal, warning of consequences if it fails to comply. However, the KRG maintains that it lacks the production capacity to meet the oil requirement.
Halwest Movement leader Ali Hama Saleh said after the meeting that his party proposed transferring the entire KRG oil sector to the federal government rather than committing to a fixed daily oil quota. Under this proposal, Baghdad would receive whatever oil the region produces and, in return, supply the KRG with fuel, petrol and other petroleum products, as it does for other Iraqi governorates.
However, both the KDP and, interestingly, the PUK have resisted this proposal, instead advocating that a portion of crude production remain allocated to the region to supply its refineries and meet domestic demand.
Meanwhile, the KRG Prime Minister has criticised the region’s proposed budget share as insufficient. Although the draft allocates 12.7% to the Kurdistan Region, sovereign expenditures now account for roughly half the federal budget. Once these are deducted, the region’s effective allocation amounts to approximately 6% of total federal expenditure.
The budget remains a draft, discussions are continuing, and no final proposal has been submitted to the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee.
However, the meeting itself is politically significant. By bringing opposition parties, particularly those critical of the KDP, into federal budget discussions for the first time, Baghdad is increasing pressure on the KRG leadership, especially the KDP, and further narrowing its room for manoeuvre.
This is notable because parties outside the KDP and PUK have not d in the coalition’s budget discussions. New Generation has three seats in the Iraqi parliament and 15 in Kudistan parliament and Halwest has five seats in the Iraqi parliament and four in the Kurdistan Parliament.
According to media reports, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Finance Minister have demanded that the KRG hand over 445,000 barrels of oil per day and adopt the ASYCUDA customs system as part of the 2027 budget deal, warning of consequences if it fails to comply. However, the KRG maintains that it lacks the production capacity to meet the oil requirement.
Halwest Movement leader Ali Hama Saleh said after the meeting that his party proposed transferring the entire KRG oil sector to the federal government rather than committing to a fixed daily oil quota. Under this proposal, Baghdad would receive whatever oil the region produces and, in return, supply the KRG with fuel, petrol and other petroleum products, as it does for other Iraqi governorates.
However, both the KDP and, interestingly, the PUK have resisted this proposal, instead advocating that a portion of crude production remain allocated to the region to supply its refineries and meet domestic demand.
Meanwhile, the KRG Prime Minister has criticised the region’s proposed budget share as insufficient. Although the draft allocates 12.7% to the Kurdistan Region, sovereign expenditures now account for roughly half the federal budget. Once these are deducted, the region’s effective allocation amounts to approximately 6% of total federal expenditure.
The budget remains a draft, discussions are continuing, and no final proposal has been submitted to the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee.
However, the meeting itself is politically significant. By bringing opposition parties, particularly those critical of the KDP, into federal budget discussions for the first time, Baghdad is increasing pressure on the KRG leadership, especially the KDP, and further narrowing its room for manoeuvre.
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The Abu Dhabi-based Al-Ain newspaper also reports, citing "an informed source", that "hundreds of oil tankers were stranded at the Turkish border". However, it adds that other "political figures have denied that there is any actual move to halt exports, stressing that oil exports ting agreements."
The newspaper also reports calls for an audit of oil export volumes and greater oversight and transparency, citing a source who claimed that "halting oil exports from Erbil could save Baghdad approximately $562.5 million per month."
It also quotes Rabie al-Mousawi, a member of the Iraqi parliament’s Oil and Gas Committee, who said that "the Prime Minister had ordered the formation of a committee to review oil exports through the Kurdistan Region, with the aim of auditing export volumes and establishing accurate figures for the quantities of oil being exported."
The newspaper also reports calls for an audit of oil export volumes and greater oversight and transparency, citing a source who claimed that "halting oil exports from Erbil could save Baghdad approximately $562.5 million per month."
It also quotes Rabie al-Mousawi, a member of the Iraqi parliament’s Oil and Gas Committee, who said that "the Prime Minister had ordered the formation of a committee to review oil exports through the Kurdistan Region, with the aim of auditing export volumes and establishing accurate figures for the quantities of oil being exported."
Muna Sami, a well-connected Iraqi journalist, claims that more than 300 tankers carrying KRG oil are stranded at the Turkish border after Turkey blocked their entry following an agreement with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi “to halt purchases of smuggled Iraqi oil from the confirmed, this would be significant, as much of the oil originates from the Lanaz refinery, which is 51% owned by Mansour Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s second son and commander of the KDP’s special forces, and 49% by Turkish investors. A substantial share of the refinery’s petroleum products has been exported to Turkey.
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The Iraqi prime minister says that when he took office on 17 May 2026, the US Federal Reserve had already suspended cash dollar shipments to Iraq for several months, citing concerns that some of the money could reach armed factions and be used for “prohibited transactions”.
, his government initially secured a monthly allocation of $140 million, which was subsequently increased to $500 million. He says a further increase to $1 billion per month is expected to be approved in the coming days.
However, he wants the Federal Reserve to occasionally supply as much as $2.5 billion in additional cash to inject into the market and narrow the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates.
Following Iraq’s devaluation of the dinar from 1,320 to 1,520 per US dollar on 7 October, the parallel-market exchange rate has remained elevated at approximately 1,685 dinars per dollar, compared with around 1,560 in late September before the devaluation.
The prime minister says the aim is to bring the parallel-market rate into line with the official rate, arguing that additional dollar supplies are necessary to close the gap. He also attributes the continued disparity partly to regional developments and US concerns over the activities of armed factions.
, his government initially secured a monthly allocation of $140 million, which was subsequently increased to $500 million. He says a further increase to $1 billion per month is expected to be approved in the coming days.
However, he wants the Federal Reserve to occasionally supply as much as $2.5 billion in additional cash to inject into the market and narrow the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates.
Following Iraq’s devaluation of the dinar from 1,320 to 1,520 per US dollar on 7 October, the parallel-market exchange rate has remained elevated at approximately 1,685 dinars per dollar, compared with around 1,560 in late September before the devaluation.
The prime minister says the aim is to bring the parallel-market rate into line with the official rate, arguing that additional dollar supplies are necessary to close the gap. He also attributes the continued disparity partly to regional developments and US concerns over the activities of armed factions.
The decision to devalue the Iraqi dinar appears to have been taken abruptly at last night's meeting of the Council of Ministers, although the issue was not on the meeting's agenda.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi reportedly told ministers that the decision had already been made, that it was urgent and in Iraq's interest, and that it had to be approved immediately, urging all ministers to vote in favour as there was no alternative.
He then asked the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), who had been waiting just outside, to join the meeting. According to reports, all ministers voted for the devaluation.
The move comes as Iraq faces mounting economic pressure and a widening deficit amid falling oil revenues. One of al-Zaidi's proposals has been to narrow the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates. Before the decision, the official rate stood at 1,320 dinars to the dollar while the parallel market rate was above 1,560. With the official rate now set at 1,520, al-Zaidi has reportedly said the aim is to keep the parallel rate as close to it as possible, ideally below 1,600.
He also instructed the CBI governor to inject as many dollars as possible into the market to bring the parallel rate down. The governor reportedly said the bank could release around $200 million a day for the foreseeable future to stabilise the exchange rate.
After initial panic today pushed the parallel rate as high as 1,800 dinars to the dollar, it has since eased to around 1,640. Further dollar injections could bring it lower, but for now it appears to be settling around that level.
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For context: journalist Muna Sami now works for Al-Awla TV, which is owned by Rayan al-Kildani, the leader of the Babylon militia, which has close ties to Shia militias, particularly Qais al-Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq.
However, she is an established journalist who previously worked for Al Rabi’a TV. Interestingly, KDP-affiliated media have launched a campaign against her, highlighting her employment at Al-Awla TV without directly refuting her claims. But that association alone does not in itself discredit what she says.
However, she is an established journalist who previously worked for Al Rabi’a TV. Interestingly, KDP-affiliated media have launched a campaign against her, highlighting her employment at Al-Awla TV without directly refuting her claims. But that association alone does not in itself discredit what she says.
Muna Sami, a well-connected Iraqi journalist, claims that more than 300 tankers carrying KRG oil are stranded at the Turkish border after Turkey blocked their entry following an agreement with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi “to halt purchases of smuggled Iraqi oil from the confirmed, this would be significant, as much of the oil originates from the Lanaz refinery, which is 51% owned by Mansour Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s second son and commander of the KDP’s special forces, and 49% by Turkish investors. A substantial share of the refinery’s petroleum products has been exported to Turkey.
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Muna Sami, a well-connected Iraqi journalist, claims that more than 300 tankers carrying KRG oil are stranded at the Turkish border after Turkey blocked their entry following an agreement with Iraqi Prime Minister al-Zaidi “to halt purchases of smuggled Iraqi oil from the confirmed, this would be significant, as much of the oil originates from the Lanaz refinery, which is 51% owned by Mansour Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s second son and commander of the KDP’s special forces, and 49% by Turkish investors. A substantial share of the refinery’s petroleum products has been exported to Turkey.
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6,463
A lot has been happening in Sinjar since last year, with far-reaching implications:
There is now a convergence between the pro-PKK YBŞ and the Yazidi Cause Alliance as well as other Yazidi figures, particularly among those who regard Sinjar as Iraqi and Yazidis as a distinct Yazidi militia with significant influence in pockets in Sinjar and is part of the PKK’s regional network.
This is significant because, for the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a grassroots Yazidi political movement has emerged that is outperforming the KDP, which has dominated Sinjar in post-Saddam Iraq.
The Yazidi Cause Alliance, formed by several prominent Yazidi activists ahead of the 2025 elections, was a new political project that many influential figures did not initially take seriously. Yet it managed to secure more than 50,000 votes in its first electoral test. This suggests it could perform even better in future elections, particularly as its success may attract more prominent and popular Yazidi figures.
What makes this alliance particularly important is several developments.
First, there was recently a disagreement between Murad Ismail, its MP and parliamentary faction leader, and the leadership of the alliance’s political wing. Remarkably, they managed to resolve their differences and are now working together. This is an important sign that the project may be more serious and sustainable than previous attempts, which often collapsed over internal disagreements. It may also suggest that more influential figures are backing it.
Second, and perhaps more fascinating, the Yazidi Cause Alliance has been negotiating politically on behalf of the YBŞ over its integration into Iraq’s security establishment. This includes an agreement for the YBŞ to withdraw from Mount Sinjar and hand over its positions to the Iraqi army in exchange for integrating its estimated 2,000 to 4,000 fighters into the Hashd al-Shaabi, as the Iraqi prime minister said yesterday (videoed).
This is notable because it means Yazidis are increasingly developing their own political representation, independent of Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. This could have far-reaching implications for Sinjar’s political future and the prospects of its return to the Kurdistan Region’s administration.
Third, this may be the first time in decades that Yazidi civilian figures and activists, rather than traditional tribal leaders, are at the forefront of such a political movement.
Historically, there have been prominent Yazidi movements independent of traditional Kurdish parties, but these were often led by tribal figures, given that Yazidis, much like Kurds, have a strongly tribal social structure.
This time, however, the Yazidi Cause Alliance is essentially a civilian, non-tribal political coalition. That makes it potentially more significant than previous attempts to establish an independent Yazidi political movement.
There is now a convergence between the pro-PKK YBŞ and the Yazidi Cause Alliance as well as other Yazidi figures, particularly among those who regard Sinjar as Iraqi and Yazidis as a distinct Yazidi militia with significant influence in pockets in Sinjar and is part of the PKK’s regional network.
This is significant because, for the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a grassroots Yazidi political movement has emerged that is outperforming the KDP, which has dominated Sinjar in post-Saddam Iraq.
The Yazidi Cause Alliance, formed by several prominent Yazidi activists ahead of the 2025 elections, was a new political project that many influential figures did not initially take seriously. Yet it managed to secure more than 50,000 votes in its first electoral test. This suggests it could perform even better in future elections, particularly as its success may attract more prominent and popular Yazidi figures.
What makes this alliance particularly important is several developments.
First, there was recently a disagreement between Murad Ismail, its MP and parliamentary faction leader, and the leadership of the alliance’s political wing. Remarkably, they managed to resolve their differences and are now working together. This is an important sign that the project may be more serious and sustainable than previous attempts, which often collapsed over internal disagreements. It may also suggest that more influential figures are backing it.
Second, and perhaps more fascinating, the Yazidi Cause Alliance has been negotiating politically on behalf of the YBŞ over its integration into Iraq’s security establishment. This includes an agreement for the YBŞ to withdraw from Mount Sinjar and hand over its positions to the Iraqi army in exchange for integrating its estimated 2,000 to 4,000 fighters into the Hashd al-Shaabi, as the Iraqi prime minister said yesterday (videoed).
This is notable because it means Yazidis are increasingly developing their own political representation, independent of Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. This could have far-reaching implications for Sinjar’s political future and the prospects of its return to the Kurdistan Region’s administration.
Third, this may be the first time in decades that Yazidi civilian figures and activists, rather than traditional tribal leaders, are at the forefront of such a political movement.
Historically, there have been prominent Yazidi movements independent of traditional Kurdish parties, but these were often led by tribal figures, given that Yazidis, much like Kurds, have a strongly tribal social structure.
This time, however, the Yazidi Cause Alliance is essentially a civilian, non-tribal political coalition. That makes it potentially more significant than previous attempts to establish an independent Yazidi political movement.
Murad Ismail, leader of the Yazidi Cause Alliance in the Iraqi parliament, now the largest Yazidi party by popular vote, says: “Sinjar is Iraqi. Sinjar is not Kurdistani; Sinjar is Iraqi.”
This is significant because the Yazidi Cause Alliance, an emerging grassroots Yazidi ured more than 50,000 votes in its electoral debut in 2025, outperforming the KDP among Yazidi voters.
Ismail also challenged the KDP over its record in Sinjar:
“Article 140 was never implemented. It has expired and ended. You [the KDP] were powerful in Baghdad. You could have implemented Article 140, but you failed to do so before 2014. Then, in 2014, the genocide [ISIS onslaught on Sinjar] occurred. And you left Sinjar in 2017. We didn’t tell you to leave Sinjar!”
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Murad Ismail, leader of the Yazidi Cause Alliance in the Iraqi parliament, now the largest Yazidi party by popular vote, says: “Sinjar is Iraqi. Sinjar is not Kurdistani; Sinjar is Iraqi.”
This is significant because the Yazidi Cause Alliance, an emerging grassroots Yazidi ured more than 50,000 votes in its electoral debut in 2025, outperforming the KDP among Yazidi voters.
Ismail also challenged the KDP over its record in Sinjar:
“Article 140 was never implemented. It has expired and ended. You [the KDP] were powerful in Baghdad. You could have implemented Article 140, but you failed to do so before 2014. Then, in 2014, the genocide [ISIS onslaught on Sinjar] occurred. And you left Sinjar in 2017. We didn’t tell you to leave Sinjar!”
This is significant because the Yazidi Cause Alliance, an emerging grassroots Yazidi ured more than 50,000 votes in its electoral debut in 2025, outperforming the KDP among Yazidi voters.
Ismail also challenged the KDP over its record in Sinjar:
“Article 140 was never implemented. It has expired and ended. You [the KDP] were powerful in Baghdad. You could have implemented Article 140, but you failed to do so before 2014. Then, in 2014, the genocide [ISIS onslaught on Sinjar] occurred. And you left Sinjar in 2017. We didn’t tell you to leave Sinjar!”
Yazidi MP-elect Murad Ismael says Yazidis are not Kurds but a distinct ethnicity, and that he will work to have this formally recognised in the Iraqi parliament.
His stance matters because, unlike previous token Yazidi MPs backed either by the KDP or pro-Iran Shia militias, t on a Yazidi Cause Alliance list that secured around 50,000 votes – the first time a purely Yazidi, grassroots list has achieved this.
Murad raises a sensitive but necessary debate. He argues that Yazidis are not Kurds and that some Kurdish parties try to impose that identity on them. He likens it to “how Kurds in Turkey don’t want to be called mountain Turks,” saying Yazidis likewise do not want to be branded “Yazidi Kurds” – a label widely used in parts of the Kurdish media, particularly outlets close to the KDP.
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According to Iraqi media reports, as Iran continues to push for the expulsion of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to a third country or their extradition to Iran, Iraq’s Shia-led Coordination Framework is reportedly floating an alternative proposal to relocate these groups from central or southern Iraq, particularly Samawah in Muthanna province.
Samawah is in a predominantly Shia area where Shia political factions and militias wield considerable influence. Under the reported proposal, the groups and their families would be relocated to heavily guarded camps. However, this is not a formal proposal and has so far only been reported in Iraqi media. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, particularly the KDPI, have said they have received no official proposal of this kind.
The reports are particularly interesting in the context of the Iranian ambassador to Iraq’s claim a few days ago that Baghdad had already agreed to either expel these groups to a third, non-neighbouring country or extradite them to Iran, amid ongoing Iraqi-Iranian security negotiations over their future.
The reported relocation proposal appears to be a less drastic alternative to expelling the groups to a third country, which could prove considerably more difficult to implement.
However, relocating them within Iraq would still represent a significant geopolitical shift. Unlike the Kurdistan Region, where the groups operate in a mountainous border area with longstanding political and social ties to local Kurdish communities, Samawah is in a predominantly Shia region where Iran-aligned factions have considerably greater influence.
This would effectively remove the groups from their traditional political and geographical environment and place them in a much more tightly controlled setting, potentially offering Tehran greater security assurances than their continued presence in the Kurdistan Region.
Samawah is in a predominantly Shia area where Shia political factions and militias wield considerable influence. Under the reported proposal, the groups and their families would be relocated to heavily guarded camps. However, this is not a formal proposal and has so far only been reported in Iraqi media. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, particularly the KDPI, have said they have received no official proposal of this kind.
The reports are particularly interesting in the context of the Iranian ambassador to Iraq’s claim a few days ago that Baghdad had already agreed to either expel these groups to a third, non-neighbouring country or extradite them to Iran, amid ongoing Iraqi-Iranian security negotiations over their future.
The reported relocation proposal appears to be a less drastic alternative to expelling the groups to a third country, which could prove considerably more difficult to implement.
However, relocating them within Iraq would still represent a significant geopolitical shift. Unlike the Kurdistan Region, where the groups operate in a mountainous border area with longstanding political and social ties to local Kurdish communities, Samawah is in a predominantly Shia region where Iran-aligned factions have considerably greater influence.
This would effectively remove the groups from their traditional political and geographical environment and place them in a much more tightly controlled setting, potentially offering Tehran greater security assurances than their continued presence in the Kurdistan Region.
The Kurdistan Freedom Party, an Iranian Kurdish armed group, was attacked in the Balisan area of northeastern Erbil. The group claims that “four Iranian ballistic missiles” struck its positions, but footage suggests the attack likely involved one-way attack drones rather than o the group, there were no casualties, as its fighters had evacuated the area before the strikes.
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Duhok has the widest gender gap in unemployment of any governorate in Iraq.
According to 2024 figures from Iraq’s Statistics and GIS Authority, 41.2% of women in Duhok’s labour force are out of work, compared with 11.3% of men, a difference of almost 30 percentage points. Only higher female unemployment, and men in both of those governorates are far more likely to be jobless than men in Duhok.
The rest of the Kurdistan Region follows the same pattern. Men in Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimani all have unemployment below the national male rate of 11.8%, while women in all three are above the national female rate of 21.4%, reaching 26.9% in Erbil and 22.6% in Sulaimani. As a result, all three governorates have overall unemployment above the Iraqi average of 13.5%, and nearly all of that excess comes from women.
Female labour force participation in Iraq is among the lowest in the world, so these rates cover a small group of women who are actively looking for work. Duhok’s figure shows how many of them cannot find it.
According to 2024 figures from Iraq’s Statistics and GIS Authority, 41.2% of women in Duhok’s labour force are out of work, compared with 11.3% of men, a difference of almost 30 percentage points. Only higher female unemployment, and men in both of those governorates are far more likely to be jobless than men in Duhok.
The rest of the Kurdistan Region follows the same pattern. Men in Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimani all have unemployment below the national male rate of 11.8%, while women in all three are above the national female rate of 21.4%, reaching 26.9% in Erbil and 22.6% in Sulaimani. As a result, all three governorates have overall unemployment above the Iraqi average of 13.5%, and nearly all of that excess comes from women.
Female labour force participation in Iraq is among the lowest in the world, so these rates cover a small group of women who are actively looking for work. Duhok’s figure shows how many of them cannot find it.
1
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The KRG Interior Ministry has denied a report by Iran’s Tasnim News Agency alleging that Ukrainian operatives deployed "thousands of micro-drones in the Kurdistan Region" as part of a wider Western campaign against Iran.
The denial follows a statement issued yesterday by ghdad, which called the allegations baseless and deliberate disinformation.
Tasnim, which is affiliated with Iran’s IRGC, cited an unnamed security source who claimed Ukraine had set up drone networks in several areas bordering Iran, including the Kurdistan Region. According to the source, Tehran regards the alleged deployments as hostile activity by Europe and NATO and is weighing an appropriate response. The report offered no evidence.
The claims are not new. In July 2026, Iraq’s National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said security forces had arrested several groups responsible for attacks on facilities inside Iraq, and that detainees had confessed to working for Ukraine. He gave no details on the suspects or the facilities targeted. On 28 July, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry rejected the allegations as unfounded and said Iraqi authorities had never raised the matter through diplomatic channels before going public.
Similar allegations surfaced in August 2025 after the arrest of former PUK co-president Lahur Sheikh Jangi in Sulaimani. PUK-led Kurdish security authorities released confessions claiming that individuals linked to an alleged plot against PUK leader Bafel Talabani had received drone training in Ukraine. Ukraine’s embassy in Baghdad denied training militants or manufacturing drones for unlawful use abroad.
The latest Iranian claims add to more than a year of disputed allegations about Ukrainian drone activity in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.
The denial follows a statement issued yesterday by ghdad, which called the allegations baseless and deliberate disinformation.
Tasnim, which is affiliated with Iran’s IRGC, cited an unnamed security source who claimed Ukraine had set up drone networks in several areas bordering Iran, including the Kurdistan Region. According to the source, Tehran regards the alleged deployments as hostile activity by Europe and NATO and is weighing an appropriate response. The report offered no evidence.
The claims are not new. In July 2026, Iraq’s National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said security forces had arrested several groups responsible for attacks on facilities inside Iraq, and that detainees had confessed to working for Ukraine. He gave no details on the suspects or the facilities targeted. On 28 July, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry rejected the allegations as unfounded and said Iraqi authorities had never raised the matter through diplomatic channels before going public.
Similar allegations surfaced in August 2025 after the arrest of former PUK co-president Lahur Sheikh Jangi in Sulaimani. PUK-led Kurdish security authorities released confessions claiming that individuals linked to an alleged plot against PUK leader Bafel Talabani had received drone training in Ukraine. Ukraine’s embassy in Baghdad denied training militants or manufacturing drones for unlawful use abroad.
The latest Iranian claims add to more than a year of disputed allegations about Ukrainian drone activity in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.
2
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2,170
The Administrative Court in Sulaimani annulled a 2016 governor’s order that had allowed Iraqis from other governorates and foreign nationals to register houses and apartments in their own names on the same terms as Sulaimani residents.
In practice, buyers from outside the needed Asayish clearance, both before and under the 2016 order, so the security services were the real gatekeeper throughout. The likely near-term effect is more discretion and delay at the registry, with no formal ban in place, and any office that started refusing Iraqis outright on the basis of origin would be on weak ground under Article 23 of the Constitution.
The order, No. 6448, was issued on 6 June 2016 by then governor Aso Fereydun at the proposal of the Sulaimani Chamber of Commerce, with the stated aim of developing tourism and the local economy. It instructed the governorate’s two real estate registration directorates to process title registrations for outside buyers directly, without referring each case back to the governor, while keeping Asayish approval as a condition. In practice it opened a route around an August 2015 Provincial Council decision that had restricted property transfers to people listed as non-Kurdish in their civil status records during the ISIS war and displacement crisis.
Three residents brought the case, arguing that the order had triggered a wave of permanent settlement from central and southern Iraq and begun to alter the demographic make-up of Sulaimani, in breach of Articles 23 and 140 of the Iraqi Constitution and the Kurdistan Parliament’s 2003 law on the Arabisation policy. The court decided the case on narrower grounds. It found that neither the 2009 Kurdistan Region Governorates Law nor the 1971 Real Estate Registration Law gives a governor the power to decide whose name residential property may be registered in, so the order lacked any legal basis, and it added that the economic justifications in the order’s preamble could not stand in for a legal text. The judgment is open to appeal.
Several outlets, including PUKmedia, reported the ruling as a ban on selling homes to Arabs and foreigners. The judgment contains no such ban. It removes the 2016 registration route, does not cancel titles already registered under it, does not reinstate the 2015 restriction, and leaves open what framework now governs registrations for buyers from elsewhere in Iraq.
That open question is where the dispute is likely to move next. Article 23 guarantees every Iraqi the right to own property anywhere in the country, a right the Federal Supreme Court affirmed inside the Kurdistan Region in 2023, while the same article prohibits ownership for the purpose of demographic change, the clause the claimants relied on. An appeal could bring both provisions before the courts together.
In practice, buyers from outside the needed Asayish clearance, both before and under the 2016 order, so the security services were the real gatekeeper throughout. The likely near-term effect is more discretion and delay at the registry, with no formal ban in place, and any office that started refusing Iraqis outright on the basis of origin would be on weak ground under Article 23 of the Constitution.
The order, No. 6448, was issued on 6 June 2016 by then governor Aso Fereydun at the proposal of the Sulaimani Chamber of Commerce, with the stated aim of developing tourism and the local economy. It instructed the governorate’s two real estate registration directorates to process title registrations for outside buyers directly, without referring each case back to the governor, while keeping Asayish approval as a condition. In practice it opened a route around an August 2015 Provincial Council decision that had restricted property transfers to people listed as non-Kurdish in their civil status records during the ISIS war and displacement crisis.
Three residents brought the case, arguing that the order had triggered a wave of permanent settlement from central and southern Iraq and begun to alter the demographic make-up of Sulaimani, in breach of Articles 23 and 140 of the Iraqi Constitution and the Kurdistan Parliament’s 2003 law on the Arabisation policy. The court decided the case on narrower grounds. It found that neither the 2009 Kurdistan Region Governorates Law nor the 1971 Real Estate Registration Law gives a governor the power to decide whose name residential property may be registered in, so the order lacked any legal basis, and it added that the economic justifications in the order’s preamble could not stand in for a legal text. The judgment is open to appeal.
Several outlets, including PUKmedia, reported the ruling as a ban on selling homes to Arabs and foreigners. The judgment contains no such ban. It removes the 2016 registration route, does not cancel titles already registered under it, does not reinstate the 2015 restriction, and leaves open what framework now governs registrations for buyers from elsewhere in Iraq.
That open question is where the dispute is likely to move next. Article 23 guarantees every Iraqi the right to own property anywhere in the country, a right the Federal Supreme Court affirmed inside the Kurdistan Region in 2023, while the same article prohibits ownership for the purpose of demographic change, the clause the claimants relied on. An appeal could bring both provisions before the courts together.
1
0
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3,082
The Kurdistan Freedom Party, an Iranian Kurdish armed group, was attacked in the Balisan area of northeastern Erbil. The group claims that “four Iranian ballistic missiles” struck its positions, but footage suggests the attack likely involved one-way attack drones rather than o the group, there were no casualties, as its fighters had evacuated the area before the strikes.
Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh, says Baghdad has agreed to expel Iranian Kurdish opposition groups from the Kurdistan Region or hand them over to Iran.
However, the Iraqi account of the 19 October security meeting is very different. Baghdad said the resolving outstanding problems with implementing the existing security agreement, while an Iraqi participant explicitly denied that any new agreement on expulsion or handover had been reached.
Under the 2023 agreement, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups were required to disarm and relocate away from the Iranian border to designated camps inside Iraq. Earlier this month, Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said Baghdad was also working with the United Nations on asylum applications for thousands of opposition members, potentially allowing their voluntary resettlement in third countries.
The conflicting accounts suggest that significant disagreements remain between Baghdad and Tehran over the future of these groups. Iran appears to be pushing for commitments beyond the existing security arrangements, potentially requiring their removal from Iraq altogether or their handover to Iranian authorities.
Although the Iranian ambassador did not explicitly specify third countries, any agreement requiring the collective expulsion of opposition members abroad would represent a major departure from the 2023 arrangement, which provided for their relocation within Iraq. Baghdad has so far neither announced nor acknowledged such a commitment.
0
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13
3,771
Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh, says Baghdad has agreed to expel Iranian Kurdish opposition groups from the Kurdistan Region or hand them over to Iran.
However, the Iraqi account of the 19 October security meeting is very different. Baghdad said the resolving outstanding problems with implementing the existing security agreement, while an Iraqi participant explicitly denied that any new agreement on expulsion or handover had been reached.
Under the 2023 agreement, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups were required to disarm and relocate away from the Iranian border to designated camps inside Iraq. Earlier this month, Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said Baghdad was also working with the United Nations on asylum applications for thousands of opposition members, potentially allowing their voluntary resettlement in third countries.
The conflicting accounts suggest that significant disagreements remain between Baghdad and Tehran over the future of these groups. Iran appears to be pushing for commitments beyond the existing security arrangements, potentially requiring their removal from Iraq altogether or their handover to Iranian authorities.
Although the Iranian ambassador did not explicitly specify third countries, any agreement requiring the collective expulsion of opposition members abroad would represent a major departure from the 2023 arrangement, which provided for their relocation within Iraq. Baghdad has so far neither announced nor acknowledged such a commitment.
However, the Iraqi account of the 19 October security meeting is very different. Baghdad said the resolving outstanding problems with implementing the existing security agreement, while an Iraqi participant explicitly denied that any new agreement on expulsion or handover had been reached.
Under the 2023 agreement, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups were required to disarm and relocate away from the Iranian border to designated camps inside Iraq. Earlier this month, Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said Baghdad was also working with the United Nations on asylum applications for thousands of opposition members, potentially allowing their voluntary resettlement in third countries.
The conflicting accounts suggest that significant disagreements remain between Baghdad and Tehran over the future of these groups. Iran appears to be pushing for commitments beyond the existing security arrangements, potentially requiring their removal from Iraq altogether or their handover to Iranian authorities.
Although the Iranian ambassador did not explicitly specify third countries, any agreement requiring the collective expulsion of opposition members abroad would represent a major departure from the 2023 arrangement, which provided for their relocation within Iraq. Baghdad has so far neither announced nor acknowledged such a commitment.
2
2
12
4,593
Today marks two full years since the 20 October 2024 election, yet the Kurdistan Region still has no new cabinet. The KRG's situation has no parallel in the world:
There is nowhere in the world, in recent history, where a peacetime government has been deadlocked for this long, alysed, while still exercising full executive authority.
What sets the KRG apart is this combination. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s ninth cabinet completed its four-year term on 10 July 2023, more than three years and three months ago, which is when critics argue it should have entered caretaker status. Weeks earlier, on 30 May 2023, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court had ruled that the Kurdistan Parliament’s extension of its own term was unconstitutional, a ruling that also ended the cabinet’s term. In 2024, before the latest election, an official US government report to Congress was already describing the KRG as operating during a “caretaker period”.
Since the election, the new parliament has met only once, to swear in MPs, and has been paralysed ever since. Meanwhile, the caretaker cabinet continues to govern with full executive powers.
A caretaker cabinet’s authority is limited to day-to-day government business. Even so, the KRG has taken at least 17 major decisions, policy measures and agreements well beyond that remit, many of them directly affecting people’s livelihoods.
Long cabinet formation deadlocks happen elsewhere too. In those cases, however, parliament keeps working and the outgoing government confines itself to routine business. In the Kurdistan Region, neither applies. Even in federal Iraq, after the 11 November 2025 election, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that then Prime Minister al-Sudani’s cabinet had become a caretaker government from election day, restricting it to day-to-day affairs, and the new parliament convened within weeks.
A complaint over the cabinet’s caretaker conduct is now before the Federal Supreme Court, which is due to hear it on 26 October.
There is nowhere in the world, in recent history, where a peacetime government has been deadlocked for this long, alysed, while still exercising full executive authority.
What sets the KRG apart is this combination. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s ninth cabinet completed its four-year term on 10 July 2023, more than three years and three months ago, which is when critics argue it should have entered caretaker status. Weeks earlier, on 30 May 2023, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court had ruled that the Kurdistan Parliament’s extension of its own term was unconstitutional, a ruling that also ended the cabinet’s term. In 2024, before the latest election, an official US government report to Congress was already describing the KRG as operating during a “caretaker period”.
Since the election, the new parliament has met only once, to swear in MPs, and has been paralysed ever since. Meanwhile, the caretaker cabinet continues to govern with full executive powers.
A caretaker cabinet’s authority is limited to day-to-day government business. Even so, the KRG has taken at least 17 major decisions, policy measures and agreements well beyond that remit, many of them directly affecting people’s livelihoods.
Long cabinet formation deadlocks happen elsewhere too. In those cases, however, parliament keeps working and the outgoing government confines itself to routine business. In the Kurdistan Region, neither applies. Even in federal Iraq, after the 11 November 2025 election, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that then Prime Minister al-Sudani’s cabinet had become a caretaker government from election day, restricting it to day-to-day affairs, and the new parliament convened within weeks.
A complaint over the cabinet’s caretaker conduct is now before the Federal Supreme Court, which is due to hear it on 26 October.
2
1
15
1,755
Opposition MP Ali Hama Salih claims that a four-way meeting between Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, PUK leader Bafel Talabani and KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani was cancelled two days ago after a dispute over the number accompany the PUK delegation.
The meeting had indeed been scheduled for that day but was called off at the last minute.
According to Hama Salih, PUK officials informed the KDP that they planned to arrive in a convoy of 16 vehicles, while the KDP insisted on limiting the delegation to 10. “Can you imagine the level their disagreements have reached?” he remarked sarcastically.
However, a separate source said the main reason for the cancellation was the failure to finalise a preliminary agreement that was meant to be formalised at the meeting. The two sides have been making a last push to form the KRG cabinet ahead of lawsuits at Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court that seek to have the KRG recognised as a caretaker government, with its authority restricted to day-to-day governance.
Tomorrow marks two full years since the Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary elections, while the current cabinet has been in office since 2019.
Some sources say the KDP and PUK have reached an understanding that would cement their two separate administrations. Under such an arrangement, the KRG would remain unified in name only, with Masrour Barzani and Qubad Talabani effectively acting as prime ministers of their respective KDP and PUK zones.
The meeting had indeed been scheduled for that day but was called off at the last minute.
According to Hama Salih, PUK officials informed the KDP that they planned to arrive in a convoy of 16 vehicles, while the KDP insisted on limiting the delegation to 10. “Can you imagine the level their disagreements have reached?” he remarked sarcastically.
However, a separate source said the main reason for the cancellation was the failure to finalise a preliminary agreement that was meant to be formalised at the meeting. The two sides have been making a last push to form the KRG cabinet ahead of lawsuits at Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court that seek to have the KRG recognised as a caretaker government, with its authority restricted to day-to-day governance.
Tomorrow marks two full years since the Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary elections, while the current cabinet has been in office since 2019.
Some sources say the KDP and PUK have reached an understanding that would cement their two separate administrations. Under such an arrangement, the KRG would remain unified in name only, with Masrour Barzani and Qubad Talabani effectively acting as prime ministers of their respective KDP and PUK zones.
6
0
39
6,056
Kirkuk’s Turkmen governor, Muhammad Seman, is refusing to give up the governorship despite being sworn in as Iraq’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, with his appointment formalised today by presidential decree. As a minister, he cannot legally hold both posts.
Yesterday, ebwar Taha - a PUK Kurd - declared that he had legally become acting governor until a replacement is appointed. Seman rejects this, arguing that under Kirkuk’s power-sharing agreement the governorship belongs to the Turkmen until the end of the year.
The dispute is closely tied to that agreement. Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq group, played a key role in brokering the original deal between Sunni leader Muhammad al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum Party and the PUK's Bafel Talabani, even though his party holds no seats on Kirkuk’s provincial council. The deal was later expanded to include the Iraqi Turkmen Front, with the governorship to be shared among Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs. Since then, Khazali has acted as a guarantor of the arrangement.
Seman met Khazali yesterday as efforts to resolve the dispute continue. PUK leader Bafel Talabani is also reportedly in Baghdad, where Kirkuk’s governorship is among the issues under negotiation. It is still unclear whether the parties will reach a settlement, and the appointment of a new governor ultimately depends on a political agreement among them.
With Iraq’s electoral commission planning to hold provincial elections next year, Kirkuk’s provincial council is unlikely to be in a hurry to elect a replacement. This could allow Taha to stay on as acting governor for the time being, unless the parties agree on a new candidate.
Legally, Seman appears to be in a weak position. Having formally taken up a ministerial post in Baghdad, he is likely to come under increasing pressure to give up the governorship. The legal question looks fairly straightforward, but the political dispute over who should succeed him remains unresolved.
Yesterday, ebwar Taha - a PUK Kurd - declared that he had legally become acting governor until a replacement is appointed. Seman rejects this, arguing that under Kirkuk’s power-sharing agreement the governorship belongs to the Turkmen until the end of the year.
The dispute is closely tied to that agreement. Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq group, played a key role in brokering the original deal between Sunni leader Muhammad al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum Party and the PUK's Bafel Talabani, even though his party holds no seats on Kirkuk’s provincial council. The deal was later expanded to include the Iraqi Turkmen Front, with the governorship to be shared among Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs. Since then, Khazali has acted as a guarantor of the arrangement.
Seman met Khazali yesterday as efforts to resolve the dispute continue. PUK leader Bafel Talabani is also reportedly in Baghdad, where Kirkuk’s governorship is among the issues under negotiation. It is still unclear whether the parties will reach a settlement, and the appointment of a new governor ultimately depends on a political agreement among them.
With Iraq’s electoral commission planning to hold provincial elections next year, Kirkuk’s provincial council is unlikely to be in a hurry to elect a replacement. This could allow Taha to stay on as acting governor for the time being, unless the parties agree on a new candidate.
Legally, Seman appears to be in a weak position. Having formally taken up a ministerial post in Baghdad, he is likely to come under increasing pressure to give up the governorship. The legal question looks fairly straightforward, but the political dispute over who should succeed him remains unresolved.
1
4
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3,420
A growing number of Syrian Kurds, particularly from Kobani, are attempting to reach the Kurdistan Region through long and costly journeys, in some cases travelling from Syria via Dubai to Iran before trying to cross the border.
According to local sources, some pay smugglers as thers end up stranded along the Iran–Kurdistan Region border, where political intervention is sometimes needed to secure their entry.
The group shown in the video appears to be stranded on the Iranian border with Sulaimani province. Those from Kobani who have already arrived are widely dispersed across the Kurdistan Region, in Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok.
The difficulty stems partly from KRG visa rules. Syrian passport holders generally need a guarantor inside the Kurdistan Region, who can face fines and legal consequences if the visitor overstays or fails to regularise their residency. Since many of those leaving Kobani are seeking permanent work and long-term settlement, finding someone willing to act as guarantor can be difficult. Legal residency and work permits involve further procedures, approvals and costs.
Many face severe economic hardship and have lost hope of better prospects in Syria, particularly since the collapse of the former frontlines of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US-backed, Kurdish-led force, and its subsequent integration into the Syrian state. According to local sources, some of those attempting to reach the Kurdistan Region previously served in the SDF’s HAT and YAT counterterrorism units but were either excluded from integration or refused to join the new security structures.
With Europe financially out of reach for most, the Kurdistan Region offers a more affordable alternative despite the costs and risks. Shared Kurdish identity also means those who overstay are likely to find more tolerance there than in the Gulf states, where such practices are not accepted. The Kurdistan Region already hosts as many as 220,000 Syrian Kurds, who have built established networks and businesses. Those networks make it easier for new arrivals to find work, housing and support, and to stay on. But the complicated visa and residency requirements have pushed some onto irregular routes through Iran, with several reported cases of people stranded at the border or disappearing during the journey.
According to local sources, some pay smugglers as thers end up stranded along the Iran–Kurdistan Region border, where political intervention is sometimes needed to secure their entry.
The group shown in the video appears to be stranded on the Iranian border with Sulaimani province. Those from Kobani who have already arrived are widely dispersed across the Kurdistan Region, in Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok.
The difficulty stems partly from KRG visa rules. Syrian passport holders generally need a guarantor inside the Kurdistan Region, who can face fines and legal consequences if the visitor overstays or fails to regularise their residency. Since many of those leaving Kobani are seeking permanent work and long-term settlement, finding someone willing to act as guarantor can be difficult. Legal residency and work permits involve further procedures, approvals and costs.
Many face severe economic hardship and have lost hope of better prospects in Syria, particularly since the collapse of the former frontlines of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US-backed, Kurdish-led force, and its subsequent integration into the Syrian state. According to local sources, some of those attempting to reach the Kurdistan Region previously served in the SDF’s HAT and YAT counterterrorism units but were either excluded from integration or refused to join the new security structures.
With Europe financially out of reach for most, the Kurdistan Region offers a more affordable alternative despite the costs and risks. Shared Kurdish identity also means those who overstay are likely to find more tolerance there than in the Gulf states, where such practices are not accepted. The Kurdistan Region already hosts as many as 220,000 Syrian Kurds, who have built established networks and businesses. Those networks make it easier for new arrivals to find work, housing and support, and to stay on. But the complicated visa and residency requirements have pushed some onto irregular routes through Iran, with several reported cases of people stranded at the border or disappearing during the journey.
6
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256
31,231
French supermarket chain Carrefour is set to close all its remaining branches in the Kurdistan Region and the rest of Iraq, reportedly following years of mounting financial losses, declining sales and rising operating costs.
Most of Carrefour’s branches were concentrated in the cularly in Erbil, which accounted for four of its eight branches across Iraq, alongside stores in Kirkuk and Baghdad. The chain, operated in Iraq by the UAE-based Majid Al Futtaim Group, had already reduced its network from 11 branches at the end of 2024 to eight by June 2026, comprising six hypermarkets and two supermarkets.
The company has reportedly decided to withdraw entirely from the Iraqi market, with most of its assets being sold to a local Iraqi company.
The withdrawal comes amid deteriorating economic conditions in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, where purchasing power has declined as a result of the ongoing war with Iran, rising energy prices and the recent devaluation of the Iraqi dinar against the US dollar, further increasing costs for businesses and consumers.
Most of Carrefour’s branches were concentrated in the cularly in Erbil, which accounted for four of its eight branches across Iraq, alongside stores in Kirkuk and Baghdad. The chain, operated in Iraq by the UAE-based Majid Al Futtaim Group, had already reduced its network from 11 branches at the end of 2024 to eight by June 2026, comprising six hypermarkets and two supermarkets.
The company has reportedly decided to withdraw entirely from the Iraqi market, with most of its assets being sold to a local Iraqi company.
The withdrawal comes amid deteriorating economic conditions in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, where purchasing power has declined as a result of the ongoing war with Iran, rising energy prices and the recent devaluation of the Iraqi dinar against the US dollar, further increasing costs for businesses and consumers.
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