Most token projects pay their founders up front. A slice of the supply is minted for the team before anyone else can buy, and vesting only sets the date it reaches the market. When the team sells, it sells to the people it was meant to be building for, and everyone who bought earlier is diluted.

A caper's founder starts with no tokens. Nothing is set aside for them at launch. They are paid a share of every trade as it happens, on buys and sells alike, mostly in radix:native, so their income depends on people still trading the caper. On a caper nobody buys into, the founder receives nothing.

The right to collect that pay is a single founder badge, and it goes to whoever holds it, never to the caper's treasury. Holders lose nothing when the badge changes hands, because it moves who is paid, not how much is taken.

caper.network/blog/the-found…

Many DAOs wait between a passed vote and its execution: Compound's timelock holds every passed proposal for at least two days. The delay gives members who lost the vote time to sell and leave, but the decision is already final and runs anyway. A caper puts a window in the same place, and selling during it counts as an objection: enough of it and the winning action does not run. A member who would have left over a proposal blocks it on the way out, and any member who has voted can still leave with their share of the treasury. How a caper's proposals pass: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

Some large DAOs grant part of their treasury a standing mandate: a manager such as karpatkey holds scoped permissions over the DAO's Safe and moves funds into pre-approved strategies without a ballot for each move. A caper has no mandate to grant. Its treasury releases funds on a short, fixed list of paths: a payment, investment or divestment that won a ballot and then survived a window in which holders can object by selling, or a member leaving with their share. How a caper pays someone from its treasury: caper.network/wiki/foundatio…

A DAO vote can pass and still wait on someone: the multisig signers who send the payment, or the contributor who submits the transaction. If that person goes quiet, the result stands and nothing is paid. In a caper, counting the ballots, opening the window in which holders can object by selling, and carrying out the winning action are each a call any account can make, so a passed action waits on no founder, signer or admin. How a caper proposal goes from ballot to execution: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

In most DAOs, a governance token bought this morning votes with the same weight as one held through every proposal the DAO has run. In a caper, buying, selling and swapping its token earn no voting record and no claim on its treasury. Both come only from casting ballots, so a member's weight in later votes and their share when they leave grow with the decisions they took part in, not with how often they traded. Trading in a caper: caper.network/wiki/markets/t…

In April 2022 an attacker borrowed about $1bn in flash loans, turned it into Beanstalk's governance stake inside one transaction, and passed a proposal that took about $182m from its treasury before repaying the loan. In a caper, a ballot weighs the stake its voter holds together with a record of the ballots they have cast, and nobody can borrow that record or receive it from another member. Capital that arrives for one vote brings the record of one ballot, against members who bring the record of every vote they have taken part in. A ballot also never counts more stake than its voter still holds when the ballots are counted, so stake sold or repaid before then stops counting. Voting in a caper: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

In many DAO chats, moderation rests with one moderator or nobody, and until someone steps in the loudest accounts set the tone. In a caper's chat rooms, any member who has voted can flag a line, and the flag carries the same weight as their ballots. A line collapses only when the members flagging it outweigh the person who wrote it, so a large position alone cannot take a line down, and stake sold since flagging stops counting. This runs in the app, not on-chain. How a caper's rooms are moderated: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

In most DAOs, a holder who never votes owns the same share of the treasury as one who votes on every proposal, so the work of governing falls on the few who do it. In a caper, a member's claim on the treasury grows with the ballots they cast, and the same record weights every later vote. A holder who has never voted can sell their tokens but redeems nothing from the treasury. How voting works in a caper: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

In most DAOs, support that floods in during a vote's last minutes decides the result, and the members who disagree find out once it already stands. In a caper, winning the vote arms an action without carrying it out. Anyone can then open a window in which holders who disagree object by selling, and the action runs only if the token's price holds up across it. How a caper proposal runs, from ballot to window: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

Caper, the week to 4 November.

Agents: every Caper MCP server, the knowledge base's and each caper's own, now has a send_feedback tool, for an agent to report what it needed or what it found wrong; a report sent from a caper's server carries that caper's cashtag. The sign-in tools, get_challenge and login, now come from the wiki engine Caper shares with radix.wiki.

Wiki: a page shared elsewhere shows its own banner as its link card, where every card used to show the same generated bubbles. The search magnifier at the foot of each page opens the results page even before the page's script has loaded. The proposal-lifecycle graphic now shows outcomes only, without fees or timings.

Writing: an X Article set leaving a company, a co-operative and a caper side by side.

How an agent reads a caper: caper.network/wiki/foundatio…

When members stop voting, most DAOs reach for a quorum: a result counts only if enough of the supply takes part. It stalls the work. In May 2025 Stargate DAO listed 12 proposals that had passed with over 70% approval while falling short of a quorum its Foundation had proposed, and holders spent July 2025 re-running each one as a ratification vote. A fixed quorum is also a number someone can price and buy.

A caper has no quorum. A proposal passes on the share of the weight actually cast, so a proposal nobody votes on fails, and a small group that agrees strongly enough can carry one. The check on a thin vote comes afterwards: a winning action goes to a window in which holders can object by selling, and only if it survives can anyone carry it out. A ballot's weight also carries the voter's record of past ballots, which no member can pass to another, so the members who settle a quiet vote bring the votes they took part in before.

caper.network/wiki/dao-gover…

When a DAO votes to invest its treasury, the vote is usually on an idea. The money then goes to a multisig or a working group to carry it out, and what gets bought, from whom and for how much is settled afterwards by whoever holds the keys. Members find out from the transaction history.

A caper settles the deal before the vote. A payment, a purchase of another caper's token or a sale of one is an option on a proposal, with its recipient and amount written in when the proposal is created. Members rank the options on a ballot. A winning action then waits through a window in which holders can object by selling, and if it survives, anyone can carry it out on-chain as written.

There is no treasurer and no signer in between. The treasury pays out only through an action that won that way, or through a member leaving with their share.

caper.network/wiki/foundatio…

In a token-voting DAO, a member who wants out can sell the token on the market, or campaign for a vote to wind the whole DAO down. Neither hands them back a share of the treasury they helped fill. Moloch DAO introduced the fix in 2019, which it called ragequit: leave with your share, no permission needed.

A caper builds that exit in. Any member who has cast a ballot can leave at any time and take their share of the treasury, in one transaction signed from their own wallet. There is no proposal to pass, no exit vote, no council to ask and no waiting period, and no founder can block it.

What it asks is that you turned up. A holder who has never voted can still sell their tokens back to the caper at any time, but the treasury share waits on a ballot, so the claim on what a caper holds sits with the members who took part in deciding what it does.

caper.network/wiki/dao-gover…

Most tokens reach the public after the people closest to them already hold a large share of the supply, through a team allocation, an early round or a premine. When those holders sell, they sell to the people who bought later.

A caper created from scratch starts with no tokens in anyone's hands. Nothing is set aside before the first buy, for the founder or anyone else. Every buyer buys from the same contract on the same terms for as long as the caper exists, and every seller sells back on those terms too, the founder included.

The founder is paid a share of every trade as it happens, so their income depends on the caper still being traded rather than on one sale at launch.

caper.network/wiki/foundatio…

A DAO proposal can pass and then fail to execute: the recipient address has a typo, the call is encoded against an old interface, or a required field was left blank. By then the vote is over, and the only fix is a second proposal and a second round of voting.

A caper checks every action on a proposal when the proposal is created, against what carrying it out will later need. A payment needs a recipient, a currency and an amount; an investment needs a target that exists. A proposal missing any of them is refused on the spot, while the proposer can still fix it, so nothing reaches a ballot that could pass and never run.

Proposals also carry no free-form calls. Each option is one of a short list of actions the contract already knows how to perform, or a debate position that executes nothing, so what members vote on is what the treasury would do.

caper.network/wiki/governanc…

Caper, week to 28 October, on Stokenet, Radix's test network.

New caper: $ASCENT, for the Radix arcade game ASCENT, launched on 25 October from a wallet outside the team, the first since the network reset.

Voting: the ballot now shows to any wallet holding the caper's token, including one that received it by transfer, which is the contract's own rule for who may vote.

Exit: Max now exits the whole balance, and the exit dialog says when it cannot read a position instead of checking forever.

Hardening: the app believes only events a Caper contract emitted; a proposal action keeps only the fields its kind uses on-chain; a proposal's status never steps backwards after a lost race; and signing out ends the session on the server.

Wiki: holders can move and delete a caper's pages, in the editor and through the MCP server. Pages gain an events block that sorts itself into upcoming and past, a locations block that says whether a place is open now, and testimonials. The editor has a new toolbar and add menu.

caper.network/capers/ASCENT?…

In a plain token vote, the balance that counts is the one a holder had when they voted, or at a snapshot taken before voting opened. Nothing ties it to what they hold when the result takes effect. A holder can vote with a large position, sell it the same day, and leave the outcome to the people who still own the token and will live with it.

Some DAOs answer with locks. Curve's vote-escrow gives voting power only to tokens locked for a fixed term, and locked tokens cannot be sold or used elsewhere until the term ends.

A caper counts each ballot at the smaller of what its voter held when voting and what they hold when the ballots are counted. Selling after voting shrinks your own ballot, so nobody can vote with a position they no longer hold, and no token has to be locked to get there.

caper.network/wiki/governanc…

In most DAOs a vote counts by the tokens behind it, so the largest wallets decide, and anyone who wants a particular result can buy the weight for it the week before the vote.

A caper counts a ballot by two things: the position its voter holds, and a record of the ballots they have cast. The record comes only from voting. Buying, selling and receiving tokens add nothing to it, and no member can pass theirs to anyone else.

So a large holder who arrives for one proposal meets members who have voted on every proposal before it, and a big bag alone can't capture control. Stake still counts: between two members with the same record, the larger holder weighs more.

How a caper's vote is counted: caper.network/wiki/governanc…

Losing a DAO vote usually ends the matter. The winning proposal goes through, and a member who voted against it can accept it or sell their tokens on the open market, leaving their share of the treasury behind.

A caper gives the losing side two moves.

If the winning option is an action, such as a payment from the treasury, it does not run when the ballot closes. Holders get a window first, and selling during that window counts as an objection. If enough holders sell, the action is blocked and can never run.

Any member who has voted at least once can also leave at any time and take their fair share of the treasury with them. Leaving is one transaction from their own wallet, not a proposal, so nobody votes on it and no founder or council can block it.

How leaving works: caper.network/wiki/foundatio…