$FSLR ripping and $CIFR dumping tells you everything you need to know about how the market is interpreting the election.

Both moves look like massive overreactions to perceived policy implications that may never actually materialize. Narrative repricing masquerading as fundamental repricing…

And btw I love $FSLR and am admitting this…

Vonovia, Germany's largest landlord, says Berlin's plan to seize apartments is legally dodgy and the wrong move. The property giant came out swinging against the state government's housing proposal. #World #T24News

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-Chinese IITs as faster way for pharma/biotech regulatory approval
-Non-alcoholic beer growth
-Copper and data center ETF correlation
-Chinese EVs and the decline of European autos
-SMRs: real or not? (HALEU supply issue)
-AI’s impact on food ordering (Instacart, DoorDash) and Google’s search business
-French banks underperforming the Stoxx Europe Banks Index: how much sovereign debt exposure do they have?
-Iceland Blue Lagoon IPO: seems overpriced

-Why is Marvell bidding for Lumentum if there are AI jitters? What do they see re: demand
-Cat insurance premiums purposefully underpriced to sell better (tail risk)

-Japan: People still opting for floating-rate mortgages despite BOJ hikes. Higher rates help old people, hurt young people.
-Australia: Property market rolling over. Higher rates hurt construction too. Look at $REA.AX?
-UK Ports: London Gateway taking share from CK Hutchison’s Felixstowe, driven by Chinese EV imports.
-Japan LNG: Emerging as a huge LNG buyer. Look at JERA.
-Boehly / Walter: Affiliated-party loans are curious. Worth digging into.

I definitely wouldn’t buy the dip in $CIFR the morning after Hinojosa ousts Abbott and presumably cancels every data center project in Texas by executive decree.

Would hate to accidentally own 700 MW of contracted capacity and a few billion dollars of development optionality at a distressed valuation… 🤷‍♂️

My favorite part of the monthly HF return tables is the inevitable unsophisticated retail investor coming out of the woodwork to explain why Millennium’s returns are pathetic.

Kid made 80% YOLO’ing $ASTS calls on Robinhood, has absolutely no idea how a multistrat operates, but genuinely believes Izzy Englander should fire 300 PMs and let him run the whole book from his iPhone...

The 13% puke today is the market questioning whether $CVI is using peak-cycle earnings to justify a transformative acquisition (nearly doubling nameplate capacity).

The $MPC assets may be attractive, but shareholders are absorbing dilution, additional debt, and the risk that refining margins normalize before the company can meaningfully delever…

$CVI was always sub-scale, so there’s a legitimate strategic rationale here. The irony is that the best time to buy cyclical assets is usually when you can least afford to finance them…

𝙋𝙤𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙚𝙙 𝙎𝙝𝙚𝙡𝙡 𝙋𝙧𝙤𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙧𝙨 (𝙋𝙎𝙋) 𝙑𝙖𝙡𝙪𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙁𝙧𝙖𝙢𝙚𝙬𝙤𝙧𝙠

$APLD $CIFR $WULF $CORZ $HUT

I think people forget that these are real estate companies. That’s why I like “Powered Shell Providers” vs. “AI/HPC” as a descriptor (h/t Morgan Stanley). wer, develop data centers and lease the infrastructure under long-term contracts. At the end of the day, they have two things of value: (1) an existing portfolio of contracted assets and (2) a pipeline of future developments. That’s it…

The valuation exercise is pretty straightforward. Take the stabilized NOI from contracted leases, apply an appropriate cap rate, subtract remaining construction costs and debt, and add back cash and other assets. That’s your theoretical “equity floor.” Then take the uncontracted pipeline, separate it into ~three? buckets based on development readiness, assign each bucket an equity value per MW and a probability of commercialization, and add the risk-adjusted value to the contracted business.

Note: You can also reverse-engineer the current share price to see how much the market is implicitly paying for the pipeline.

So what’s the worst-case scenario? Why should $CRWV neocloud debt blowing out matter to a landlord with a 15-year lease? There are legitimate risks. Some projects aren’t fully financed, some tenants are more creditworthy than others, and higher financing costs can impact both the ability to complete existing developments and the value of contracted cash flows. Given the leverage involved, even a modest increase in cap rates can have an enormous impact on residual equity value. That’s why the contracted floor isn’t necessarily a hard floor… (but this is true for every stabilized real estate company)

But I think the market is conflating two very different things: the value of infrastructure already contracted to a creditworthy tenant and the value of speculative capacity that still needs to be financed, built and leased. Neoclouds own GPUs, rent out compute and face enormous hardware depreciation and recurring capital requirements. PSPs are fundamentally landlords. A deterioration in neocloud financing conditions absolutely matters for tenant credit and future development, but it doesn’t automatically mean that every existing lease is worth less...

ZELENSKIY CONFIRMS UKRAINE, RUSSIA, US MEETING IN ABU DHABI ON NOV 10-11

Interesting underperformance in $MGM vs. comps…

Ah, much better thx

Am a buyer of $CIFR equity here

At these levels you are getting in at a LFCF yield of 14.2% on fully contracted & funded NOI (fully diluted)

Where over half the NOI is underpinned by 15Y triple-net leases with Amazon and the remainder by a 20Y MG lease with Google support (TBC on tSP equities as fixed-income in nature with an embedded option value on pipeline / platform

Earlier this year, values assigned to the option component were grossly inflated, exposing investors to downside asymmetry

That convexity profile has now inverted: free option with attractive running cash-on-cash yield to boot (at a wide-enough spread vs. the credit complex)

AI Infrastructure space is a massive game of relative value right now

I view $CIFR equity as better R/R when compared to $CRWV unsecured bonds for example

With $CRWV bonds, you are betting on 20x different variables with capped upside

In the case of $CIFR equity you are taking (very) marginal last-mile risk from here on contracted capacity

Close to home free on contracted revenue covering the current adj. EV of the business 2x over (there is a reason why the PF bonds are the tightest in the broader complex)

Future growth is NOT required for the trade to work here

If pipeline development economics make sense great, if not that's also ok (as long as management stays disciplined)

Have run a similar analysis across all PSP equities which will share (spoiler: this does not translate across the board)

Going to start documenting these Bloomberg Daybreak tiles every morning, if only to track how quickly the prevailing market narrative shifts.

It’s art…

“CRACKS APPEAR”

“BREATHER”

Why isn’t $GRND asymmetric into the 11/5 print? At $12.65, it’s ~10x ‘27 EBITDA pre-Freddie, alt data shows MAUs reaccelerating, and the call should clarify Freddie’s margin dilution. The Ithaca Holdings take-private of $BMBL and Zage’s $18 bid last year provide interesting valuation reference points…

What’s the bear actually leaning on?

The market seems to be valuing $GRND like a traditional swipe app with a shrinking payer base ($MTCH), rather than a utility for a community with no real substitute.

The engagement numbers are absurd. Data shows Grindr users spending 6h 27m/month on the app vs. 2h 10m for Hinge ~3x and ~4.3x, respectively). Add $26.50 ARPPU, 16% payer growth, and ~42% EBITDA margins.

Not exactly the economics of a dying dating app…

At what price does $SOC become an attractive long-duration call option on the eventual restart of Santa Ynez? $3? $2? $1.50?

Obviously, the question is whether the equity can survive the liquidity runway without getting diluted into oblivion. But at some price, the asymmetry has to become compelling…

𝙀𝙭-𝘼𝙣𝙩𝙚 𝙫𝙨. 𝙀𝙭-𝙋𝙤𝙨𝙩 𝘾𝙖𝙩𝙖𝙡𝙮𝙨𝙩𝙨

One of the more important distinctions in catalyst-driven investing is “ex-ante” vs. “ex-post” catalysts (my words). Both can offer significant valuation dislocations, but the mechanics of realizing that value are …

“Ex-ante” trades are cleaner. You identify a gap between price and intrinsic value, with an upcoming event (spin-off, asset sale, regulatory decision, etc.) that can force the market to reassess the security. You have a mechanism for value realization and at least (some) visibility into timing.

“Ex-post” trades are much harder. Something unexpected happens, investors “shoot first, ask questions later,” and the stock collapses. Deep-value and distressed investors love these situations because the apparent discount to intrinsic value can be enormous. But the event that created the dislocation does absolutely nothing to resolve it.

Look at $BAYN, where an identifiable June litigation catalyst helped drive a meaningful rerating. Contrast that with $CODI following its Lugano accounting scandal, where the stock collapsed from the high teens into the single digits. It took months of financial reporting progress, improved visibility, and renewed confidence for the stock to recover even partially. On the flip side, look at $VRRM following its major contract loss, where what initially looked like a massive overreaction was followed by further deterioration, with the stock now at $2.80.

The irony is that ex-post trades almost always require a new “mini ex-ante” catalyst to unlock value. Otherwise you’re simply betting that the market eventually recognizes something is cheap. That can take years, and even then the security may never recover anywhere close to its prior valuation.

The lesson is that a catalyst creating a valuation gap is not the same as a catalyst closing it. Cheapness is not a catalyst, and the magnitude of a selloff tells you very little about the probability of recovery…